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2007 /Balancing the Scales of "Confidential" Justice
"[Slociety's need for evidence to avoid an inaccurate decision is
greatest in the criminal context-both for evidence that might convict the
guilty and exonerate the innocent-because the stakes of human liberty
and public safety are at their zenith. '
I. INTRODUCTION
"You are now being placed under mediation; you have the right to remain
silent; and anything you say can but probably won't be used against you in a
court of law." Surely such a facetious attempt at an opening statement should not
commence any form of mediation.2 But this recognition does not make the
statement any less accurate, at least with regard to the enigmatic framework of
mediation confidentiality.3 What this mediation Miranda does highlight,
however, is an increasingly complex mediator's dilemma: to what extent are
mediation communications protected, and what degree of disclosure is sufficient
to place parties on notice? The web of confidentiality agreements, rules of
evidentiary exclusion, common law and statutory privileges, sunshine laws,
malpractice exceptions, and ethical disclosure requirements is difficult for even a
lawyer mediator to navigate, let alone a community mediator or the actual parties
S• 4
to a mediation. Of course, this reality ignores the question of much greater
consequence: to what extent should mediation be confidential or privileged,
subsequently leaving competing policy interests in the balance?'
* Law Clerk to the Honorable David L. Bunning, U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of
Kentucky. J.D., The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law, magna cum laude, Order of the Coif, 2006;
M.B.A., Sullivan University, summa cum laude, 2004; B.A., University of Kentucky, summa cum laude, Phi
Beta Kappa, 2003. The author conveys his sincere thanks to Kristen Blankley and Professor Amy Cohen for
their invaluable input. As always, the views expressed in this article, as well as the inevitable mistakes and
omissions, are solely those of the author and should not be attributed to the United States Courts or any judicial
officer thereof. Finally, the author's gratitude is extended to his family for their ubiquitous love and support.
1. UNIF. MEDIATION Acr, Official Comments, § 6(b)(1) (2001).
2. However, some might suggest this type of disclaimer or warning might be appropriate for the
newfangled area of criminal mediations that have begun to see modest implementation, e.g., victim/offender
mediation. See generally Maureen E. Laflin, Remarks on Case-Management: Criminal Mediation, 40 IDAHO L.
REV. 571, 621-22 (2004).
3. Even this "warning" statement is not entirely accurate, as many courts enforce a good faith
requirement during mandatory, court-annexed mediation that would effectively take away any right to remain
silent. See generally Ulrich Boettger, Efficiency Versus Party Empowerment-Against a Good-Faith
Requirement in Mandatory Mediation, 23 REV. LITIG. 1, 2-4 (2004).
4. From my brief experience as a court-approved mediator for the Small Claims Division of the Franklin
County (Ohio) Municipal Court, it became readily apparent that determining what to tell parties at the
beginning of a mediation session with regard to confidentiality is no simple task.
5. For the sake of clarification, it is important to highlight from the outset the potentially confusing
terminology associated with a discussion of confidentiality in the legal context, especially as it relates to
mediation. The term "confidentiality," while most often referring to a very broad concept that equates, in the
current context, to the protection of all communications during and in furtherance of a mediation, is also utilized
in a more specific respect when referring to keeping communications out of court via evidentiary privileges. See
Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go the Privileges, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 24-25
(2001) ("Confidentiality is constructed from two distinct, but intertwined principles which arise out of certain
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When confronted with this quandary, the conventional response by the
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) establishment-now largely manifested
within the Uniform Mediation Act (UMA) 6-- has long favored confidentiality
over policies or interests that would threaten to erode the wall that has
historically attempted to shield mediation from the outside world.7 This
somewhat predictable response has been at least partially propagated by a
mediation culture emphasizing a traditional and sustained focus on an interest-
based paradigm-as opposed to a more rights-based approach-where
perpetuation of the institution often sacrifices protection of the single participant.8
In other words, the good of the individual must frequently yield to the good of
the whole, which is a dynamic not uncommon to the judicial system as a whole.9
This classic conflict in the mediation context is only magnified when the
competing interests reside within the criminal arena, along the front lines of a
constitutional battleground. These exceptional interests, which demand a greater
degree of scrutiny, are directly implicated when mediation privileges are aimed at
professional relationships such as: attorney-client, clergy-penitent, doctor-patient, and now, mediator-disputant.
Confidentiality represents, first, a positive duty not to disclose secret communications and, second, the freedom
to refuse to answer questions in court."); see also infra note 6 (illustrating the distinction between general
confidentiality, "outside" confidentiality, and confidentially in legal proceedings, as seen within the UMA
framework).
6. See generally UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (2001); see also infra Part IV (discussing the UMA).
7. Even so, many ADR scholars recognize the need for limits on confidentiality. See Ellen E. Deason,
Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal System, 17 OHO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 239, 240
(2002) ("The benefits of confidentiality flow from each party's expectation, during a mediation, that neither the
mediator nor the other party will be able to disclose later what transpires. But because mediation confidentiality
is not (and should not be) absolute, the strength of this expectation depends on the ability to predict, at least
roughly, the limits on disclosure in a future dispute."); Kevin Gibson, Confidentiality in Mediation: A Moral
Reassessment, 1992 J. DisP. RESOL. 25, 26 (expressing that some degree of confidentiality may be necessary to
maintain the efficacy of mediation, but it would be incorrect to assume absolute confidentiality is necessary);
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note ("As with other privileges, the mediation privilege must have limits ...
to give appropriate weight to other valid justice system values.").
8. The fear that seems to persist, and perhaps justifiably so, is that a procedural focus on the protection
of individual rights may jeopardize the substantive impact that mediation is capable of producing for
participants across a broad spectrum of circumstantial boundaries. For example, in the area of mediation
confidentiality, the web of confidentiality caveats enumerated earlier are rarely disclosed to parties in a
mediation, at least not in their entirety. The default approach is to inform participants that the mediation is
confidential and that the mediator will not voluntarily disclose communications during the mediation. But even
where there is selective disclosure regarding exceptions to the confidentiality protection, the parties are never
fully informed of the myriad of circumstances under which something said during a mediation may make its
way onto the public streets or into the halls of justice, whether caused by actual party disclosure or an
"involuntary" disclosure by the mediator.
9. The procedural posture of the current discussion does not even account for the impact, good or bad,
that the interest-based paradigm has on the substantive aspects of mediation outcomes. The internal dialogue of
the trained mediator does not ordinarily dwell on the question of whether a party is getting at least what they
would be entitled to at trial, leaving them no worse off. Whether or not the mediator can even adequately assess
the merits of a case, a party's BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) is not of consequence
except as a strategic tool for the mediator. Instead, only the willingness of the party to resolve their dispute is
emphasized and ensured-i.e., to protect against a coerced settlement.
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the criminal system.'0 Classifying such interests as "exceptional" seems fitting in
the sense that the classical debate surrounding evidentiary privileges for
mediation communications customarily takes the form of "exceptions" to a broad
privilege.' Thus, if we are to commence the discussion from a stipulated premise
that a broad mediation privilege is beneficial and/or necessary to foster candor,
exhibit neutrality, and maintain the viability of the mediation process, then the
debate effectively shifts to a question of what policy interests warrant exceptions
to an otherwise categorical privilege and to what degree will those exceptions
operate to pierce the veil of confidentiality.
This Article offers an examination of such an exception that arises when a
mediation privilege is invoked within a criminal context to exclude evidence.
"This potential criminal proceedings exception could become one of the most
controversial issues in emerging mediation law." 2 In addressing the prospects of
a mediation privilege that would apply in criminal proceedings, the UMA created
a qualified privilege that effectively codifies the traditional legislative and
judicial approach of weighing the systemic need for evidence in the criminal
setting against the value of the mediation process and the importance of
confidentiality to that process.'3 Following an introductory discussion of the
origins of these vying interests-the need for evidence versus confidentiality-in
Parts II and III of this Article respectively, the details of the UMA approach are
explored in Part IV, along with state reaction to the proposed legislation
proffered by the UMA.
10. The drafters of the UMA acknowledged that "society's need for evidence to avoid an inaccurate
decision is greatest in the criminal context-both for evidence that might convict the guilty and exonerate the
innocent-because the stakes of human liberty and public safety are at their zenith." UNIF. MEDIATION ACT,
Official Comments, § 6(b)(1).
11. An evidentiary privilege is defined as: "[aln evidentiary rule that gives a witness the option to not
disclose the fact asked for, even though it might be relevant; [or] the right to prevent disclosure of certain
information in court, esp. when the information was originally communicated in a professional or confidential
relationship." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 554 (8th ed. 2001). By contrast, substantive privileges are different
from evidentiary privileges because "substantive privileges partly or completely shield the holder from liability
for certain claims," while evidentiary privileges "only shield the holder from providing certain evidence."
Eileen A. Scallen, Federal Privileges in the 21st Century: Relational and Informational Privileges and the Case
of the Mysterious Mediation Privilege, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 537, 538 n.4 (2004).
12. Rebecca H. Hiers, Navigating Mediation's Uncharted Waters, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 531, 578-79
(2005); see also Hughes, supra note 5, at 38-39 (referring to the criminal proceedings exception under section
6(b) as a "more controversial exception" relative to the categorical exceptions under section 6(a)).
13. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the specifics of the UMA's privilege exception for criminal
proceedings); see also STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND
OTHER PROCESSES 429 (4th ed. 2003) ("In deciding whether to recognize a mediation privilege, legislatures and
courts weigh the need for the evidence against the importance of effective mediation and the utility of
confidentiality in promoting the effectiveness of mediation."). Of course, when this balancing is performed by a
judge in a specific case, the evidentiary interest shifts from a systemic need for evidence that lawmakers
consider when looking at the utility and policy of a privilege generally to an individualistic need for the
particular evidence in question, looking most often to the reliability of the evidence as well as its probative
value in the context of the contemporaneous trial.
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The position of this Article is that the UMA's qualified privilege for civil
mediation communications is unconstitutional as applied to criminal
proceedings, or at the very least undesirable from a justice perspective. 4 To that
effect, the focus of this Article lies principally on the contention that the burden
of proof required to overcome the mediation privilege in a criminal proceeding
under the UMA-i.e., "substantially outweighs"-is an unconstitutional and
undesirable threshold. This thesis will be developed in Part V, which weighs both
sides of the debate in a manner similar to that of a court presented with a question
of admissibility, although this hearing would not be conducted in camera.
Finally, Part VI examines possible alternatives to the UMA framework, favoring
one approach in particular.
II. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: THE NEED FOR EVIDENCE
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a
fundamental maxim that the public.., has a right to every man's
evidence. When we come to examine the various claims of exemption,
we start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to give
what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exemptions which
may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a
positive general rule.'5
These statements by Dean Wigmore simply recognize the self-evident truth
that the administration of justice requires evidence. Whenever otherwise
admissible evidence is made inadmissible because of competing interests, such as
those anchoring evidentiary privileges, justice is necessarily affected. To what
degree justice is affected, and even in what direction (i.e., negatively or
positively), are the questions of greatest import; the answers to these questions
will often prove dispositive in the ultimate determination of evidentiary
admissibility.
In the law, there are two sides to every story. In the context of how mediation
privileges impact the criminal justice system, there exists a similar sense of
duality. Just as a privilege may keep out evidence adverse to a criminal
defendant, a privilege may likewise be invoked to keep out evidence that is
potentially advantageous to the defense of the accused. 6 While the truth-seeking
14. The idea for this Article was initially sparked by the decision in New Jersey v. Williams, 877 A.2d
1258 (N.J. 2005). In Williams, the defendant asserted that the "substantially outweighs" qualifier under the
UMA's mediation privilege exception for criminal proceedings "'substantially' represents an unconstitutional
evidentiary restriction." Id. at 1265. The defendant argued that the court should instead "consider only whether
the need [for the mediation communications evidence] 'outweighs' the confidentiality interests, a standard that
is less burdensome for [the] defendant." Id. at 1265 (emphasis added).
15. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 64 (3d
ed. 1940)).
16. According to the UMA, the criminal proceedings exception to the mediation privilege was
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function of the courts mandates a systemic need for evidence to discover truth
generally, this function is most often explored from the prosecution's perspective
and in terms of inculpatory evidence. Other principles, specific to the accused,
are in place to ensure that criminal defendants have the ability to present a
complete defense through offerings of exculpatory evidence.
The following discussion addresses both perspectives, beginning with the
State's need for inculpatory evidence, and concludes by placing everything into
context to better explain how these situations might arise.
A. Inculpatory Evidence: Quaere Verum (To Seek the Truth)
The general need for evidence is based upon the "normally predominant
principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth."' 7 While this
so-called truth-seeking function is not explicitly articulated within the language
of the Constitution,'8 it is an essential precept recognized by the courts
throughout the course of the common law as the singular, threshold function of
the judiciary. "It is the fundamental duty of a public court in our society to do
justice-to resolve disputes in accordance with the law when the parties don't."' 9
It is true that the pursuit of justice is not a one-sided pursuit. Truth and
justice equates not only to convicting the guilty, but also to exonerating the
innocent. After all, the accused are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Ergo, the truth-seeking justification applies equally to both
inculpatory as well as exculpatory contexts. Nevertheless, for purposes of this
discussion, and in an attempt to trace the traditional debate in this area, the truth-
seeking function or justice interest will be articulated from the prosecution's
consciously drafted to apply equally to exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT,
Official Comments, § 6(b)(1) ("[lit is drafted in a manner to ensure that both the prosecution and the defense
have the same right with respect to evidence, thus assuring a level playing field.").
17. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960).
18. But see the California Constitution's "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision:
(d) Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote
of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any
criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or
hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this
section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or
Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory
or constitutional right of the press.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
19. Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 1999). The court further
explained that: "Confidence in our system of justice as a whole, in our government as a whole, turns in no small
measure on confidence in the courts' ability to do justice in individual cases. So doing justice in individual
cases is an interest of considerable magnitude." Id.
20. See, e.g., Rinaker v. Super. Ct. of San Joaquin County, 62 Cal. App. 4th 155, 165 (1998). In ruling
that a mediator's testimony was admissible in a juvenile delinquency proceeding for impeachment, the court
held: "When balanced against the competing goals of preventing perjury and preserving the integrity of the
truth-seeking process of trial ... the promotion of settlements must yield .. " Id.
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perspective. This is primarily based on simplifying the discussion while
simultaneously recognizing that the defendant's perspective (i.e., exculpatory
evidence) is best presented and understood from a constitutional rights standpoint
outlined in the forthcoming section.
Ironically, while the need for evidence from the prosecutor's perspective is
often lost among the potential injustice that could occur when a defendant's
constitutional rights are at stake, it is the much more common scenario where
evidence sought from a mediation is inculpatory in nature.2' In other words,
prosecutors are the more frequent proponents of mediation evidence, although
such cases are still very rare. But the debate too often centers around exculpatory
evidence as the sole justification for why mediation communications might be
admissible, when the needs of justice, as symbolized by the prosecution's truth-
seeking function, should be an equally weighty rationale. Even the UMA, in
addressing the criminal proceedings exception, emphasized the conscious effort
to "ensure that both the prosecution and the defense have the same right with
respect to evidence, thus assuring a level playing field. 22
B. Exculpatory Evidence: Right to Present a Defense
Given the rights-based social structure in which we live our daily lives, 23 it
would not be surprising that most non-lawyers, and even some practitioners,
would consider the essential right of a criminal defendant to bring forth a proper
defense to be of direct constitutional origin. However, there is no mention of any
such right among the hallowed words of our founding document. But it is a well-
known and vital constitutional precept, even for textualists, that the Constitution
is a living document and contains a wealth of rights and laws not found in the ink
that soaks the parchment. The Constitution may not explicitly articulate the right
of an accused to present a defense; nevertheless, this quasi-constitutional
sentiment has been guaranteed to defendants as an aggregate understanding of
rights for the accused that are found within the black letter law of the Bill of
Rights.
In essence, a defendant is understood to possess a right to a fair trial.24 A fair
trial, at its core, translates to both sides having equal opportunity to offer proof in
the form of evidence. To the contrary, rules of evidence are in place to sustain
certain countervailing policies. But over the latter half of the twentieth century
21. See infra Part II.C (outlining various scenarios where both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence can
arise during a prior mediation).
22. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 6(b)(1).
23. "There is no more telling indicator of the extent to which legal notions have penetrated both popular
and political discourse than our increasing tendency to speak of what is most important to us in terms of rights,
and to frame nearly every social controversy as a clash of rights." MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 3-4 (1991).
24. See Rinaker, 62 Cal. App. 4th at 165. The court discusses the defendant's constitutional rights
pertaining to confrontation and due process. Id.
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and into the new millennium, "Supreme Court decisions based on the compulsory
process clause, the confrontation clause, and the due process clause have held
that in some situations the defendant's right to present relevant evidence in her
defense must override evidentiary rules to the contrary."" In other words, the
individual constitutional rights of an accused can, should, and quite often do
override evidentiary privileges when the circumstances of a case so require.
These individual rights-namely compulsory process, the right to confrontation,
and due process-are interpreted to collectively embody the commonsense
notion that the accused should have the ability to present a proper defense of any
accusations brought forward by the State.
1. Compulsory Process
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, 26 guarantees that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor."27 The compulsory process clause is considered
one of the most "overlooked, underutilized, and rarely discussed" constitutional
provisions in the Bill of Rights. 2s At first glance, it may seem that compulsory
process simply authorizes subpoena power for defendants, which it does. The
fundamental guarantee of compulsory process is the right to offer the testimony
of witnesses and to subsequently compel their attendance. However, the
significance of the right runs much deeper.
To bring this into the context of the current discussion, when an evidentiary
privilege, namely a mediation privilege, operates to keep a witness from
testifying, compulsory process is inevitably offended. The Supreme Court has
interpreted compulsory process to be "a fundamental element of due process of
law" and "is in plain terms the right to present a defense, [and] the right to
present the defendant's version of the facts., 29 This recognition by the Court that
compulsory process is a crucial piece of a defendant's right to a fair trial, and that
the right "stands on no lesser footing" relative to other rights of the criminal
defendant, illustrates the respect that the right to compulsory process demands.3°
25. Welsh S. White, Evidentiary Privileges and the Defendant's Constitutional Right to Introduce
Evidence, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 377, 381 (1989).
26. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967) ("The right of an
accused to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor stands on no lesser footing than the
other Sixth Amendment rights that we have previously held applicable to the States.").
28. See Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment's Lost Clause: Unearthing Compulsory Process, 2002
Wis. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2002).
29. Washington, 388 U.S. at 19.
30. Id. at 18.
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2. Right to Confrontation
In addition to compulsory process and various other rights of the accused, the
Sixth Amendment also guarantees a criminal defendant the right "to be
confronted with the witnesses against him."'" However, as with the compulsory
process clause, the confrontation clause has a much greater significance than
what may appear on its face. According to the Supreme Court: "Confrontation
means more than being allowed to confront witnesses physically. 'Our cases
construing the [confrontation] clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is
the right of cross-examination."' 32 Cross-examination, and the coexisting right of
impeachment, are the "principal means by which the believability of a witness
and the truth of his testimony are tested.,
3
But the right to confrontation and subsequent cross-examination has never
been absolute. In New Jersey v. Williams, a case involving a mediation privilege,
the defendant was charged with aggravated assault and proffered a mediator's
testimony to support a claim of self-defense.34 Ultimately holding that the
defendant did not make the requisite showing to overcome the mediation
privilege, the court rejected the defendant's constitutional claims on several
grounds, including the assertion that the defendant "received that which the
Confrontation Clause guarantees: 'an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense might wish.'
' 35
Nevertheless, the right to cross-examine and the ability to impeach are
crucial elements of presenting a defense. To illustrate, in Rinaker v. Superior
Court of San Joaquin County, defendants in a juvenile delinquency proceeding
for vandalism offered a statement made by the alleged victim in a civil
harassment mediation that ran concurrent to the delinquency proceeding.36 The
victim admitted in mediation that he did not see who vandalized his car. 37 The
court permitted the mediator's testimony as a means of potentially impeaching
the victim's statements at trial if he decided to testify. Recognizing the essential
place of cross-examination in the adversarial system, especially in the criminal
context, the court held that "[w]hen balanced against the competing goals of
preventing perjury and preserving the integrity of the truth-seeking process of
trial ... the promotion of settlements must yield to the constitutional right to
effective impeachment. 3 s
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
32. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)).
33. Id. at 316.
34. 877 A.2d 1258, 1260 (N.J. 2005).
35. Id. at 1270 (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)).
36. 62 Cal. App. 4th 155 (1998).
37. See id. at 162.
38. Id. at 167.
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3. Due Process
If any constitutional maxim embodies the essence of a right of the accused to
present a defense, it is the guarantee of due process that permeates every rung of
the judicial process ladder. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment in the State context, demands that
"no person shall be.. . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."39 In layman's terms, due process is effectively a recognition and
enforcement of fair play. When the State takes action to prosecute one of its own,
it is vital that the accused be given a full and fair opportunity to answer the
charges and that procedures be put in place to ensure that the rights of the
accused to be heard are protected at all stages of prosecution.
The guarantee of due process is often portrayed as a catch-all provision that
inherently encompasses other rights of the accused in a criminal setting. For
example, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses has "long been
recognized as essential to due process."O As sucl, due process is more of an
abstract concept that represents a broad right to a fair trial and the protection of
procedural and even some substantive rights. 4 ' Accordingly, when a mediation
privilege is invoked to prevent a criminal defendant from proffering testimonial
evidence of prior mediation communications, the due process implications are
inescapable.
C. Contexts in Which Evidence Arises
The preceding sections may identify the primary justifications behind the
need for evidence in criminal proceedings, but it is not always clear how this
evidence originates in a mediation setting. There are, however, several scenarios
where communications made during civil mediations could carry potential
criminal implications from both the prosecution and defense perspectives.42 In the
context of inculpatory evidence, the first and perhaps the most easily
comprehended scenario is an admission of past criminal conduct. It is not
39. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
41. The Due Process clause has been interpreted "as imposing two separate limits on government,
usually called 'procedural due process' and 'substantive due process."' ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 523 (2d ed. 2002). Procedural due process applies in the context of
evidentiary privileges, and rules of evidence generally, because it concerns "what form of hearing the
government must provide when it takes a particular action." Id.
42. Although the subject of this article is civil mediations and how criminal evidence may arise therein,
various criminal mediation mechanisms (e.g., victim-offender programs, night prosecutor mediation programs,
juvenile mediations, etc.) are becoming more prevalent and by their very nature involve the disclosure of
potentially inculpatory evidence. Accordingly, and in similar fashion to proffer sessions, criminal mediations
require a categorical privilege to keep all communications out of court in order for such mechanisms to operate
with any degree of success or to operate at all. See infra Part VI.B (proposing an amended privilege for the
UMA that includes a categorical privilege for evidence arising from criminal mediations).
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difficult to imagine a party discussing a past event that either knowingly or
unknowingly involved criminal conduct.43 When a mediation party makes such a
statement, it is possible not only that the statement could be used as evidence in a
future criminal proceeding but also that an inculpatory statement could actually
spark an otherwise unlikely or even incognizable prosecution. Because of this
reality, the UMA explicitly states that the various categorical exceptions
pertaining to criminal activity found in the UMA do not cover "mediation
communications constituting admissions of past crimes, or past potential crimes,
which remain privileged.""
A similar scenario that likewise involves past criminal conduct and that
frequently produces inculpatory mediation evidence is concurrent proceedings.
Quite often, circumstances that result in criminal prosecutions also result in a
civil action, and vice versa. However, the label "concurrent proceedings" is not
meant literally, at least not in a temporal sense. It is when proceedings arise from
the same events that the concurrent dynamic is in place. The reason why this
scenario is so common, relatively speaking, is because discussing the
circumstances of a case during civil mediation will inevitably involve discussing
matters relevant to the concurrent criminal proceeding. Because this scenario
may be the most common, yet instinctually feels the most unfair to prospective
criminal defendants, some have argued for a categorical privilege (i.e., no
exception) that would apply only to concurrent proceedings scenarios.
Another unique scenario that can arise in mediation, particularly family law
mediations and other situations involving physical abuse or violence, is
statements or threats of ongoing or future criminal activity. Because of the
immediacy of such a scenario and the ability to prevent further harm from
occurring, as well as the policy of preventing abuse of the mediation forum, most
lawmakers have provided exceptions for these scenarios where a privilege might
otherwise prevent disclosure. The UMA carves out several categorical exceptions
43. An example given by the UMA explains that "discussions of past aggressive positions with regard to
taxation or other matters of regulatory compliance in commercial mediations remain privileged against possible
use in subsequent or simultaneous civil proceedings." UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 6(a)(4).
The communications would also remain privileged against use in criminal proceedings unless the lUMA's
criminal proceedings exception applied, which is of course the subject matter of this Article.
44. Id. § 6(a)(4). Section 6(a) of the UMA enumerates three categorical exceptions that pertain to
potential criminal activity by a mediation party:
There is no privilege under Section 4 for a mediation communication that is:
(3) a threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury or commit a crime of violence;
(4) intentionally used to plan a crime, attempt to commit or commit a crime, or to conceal an
ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity;...
(7) sought or offered to prove or disprove abuse, neglect, abandonment, or exploitation in a
proceeding in which a child or adult protective services agency is a party ....
Id. § 6(a).
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for these types of scenarios, 45 and the justifications implicate alternative public
policy rationales beyond, or perhaps in spite of, the need for evidence 46
Unlike with inculpatory evidence, there are not as many well-defined
scenarios where potentially exculpatory communications are made during a
mediation that could be used in a future criminal setting. 4' However, there is one
scenario similar to that discussed in the inculpatory context that has the potential
to produce exculpatory evidence. Where a civil action runs concurrently with a
criminal prosecution, and the civil case is mediated, it would seem likely that
something said during such mediation, although almost always privileged in the• 41
actual civil action, might be of exculpatory value for the criminal phase.
For example, in New Jersey v. Williams, the defendant was charged with
aggravated assault and proffered a mediator's testimony pertaining to the alleged
assault victim's statement in a concurrent civil harassment mediation that he
attacked the defendant first.4 9 The court prohibited the testimony under a statutory
mediation privilege, and the trial resulted in the defendant's conviction. The New
Jersey Supreme Court upheld the conviction, applying the UMA analysis, even
though the mediator verified after the conclusion of the assault trial that the
alleged victim admitted, during the mediation, that he was the primary
50
aggressor.
One can also speculate, in the same concurrent civil/criminal dynamic, that
criminal defendants might sometimes wish to testify themselves about
communications made during a civil mediation. However, not only would the
Federal Rules of Evidence act to keep most such evidence out as hearsay, but this
scenario would likewise be covered by most mediation privileges because the
other party has the authority to block any testimony involving mediation
communications, regardless of the first party's obvious waiver." Under the
45. See id.
46. See, e.g., UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 6(a)(3) ("The policy rationales supporting
the privilege do not support mediation communications that threaten bodily injury or crimes of violence. To the
contrary, in cases in which a credible threat has been made disclosure would serve the public interest in safety
and the protection of others."); id. § 6(a)(4) ("[1]t should be noted that this exception is intended to prevent the
abuse of the privilege as a shield to evidence that might be necessary to prosecute or defend a crime."); id. §
6(a)(7) ("An exception for child abuse and neglect is common in domestic mediation confidentiality statutes,
and the Act reaffirms these important policy choices States have made to protect their citizens.").
47. The case law in this area is sparse, as in the area of mediation privileges generally (especially
involving criminal proceedings), and the notable cases that do exist mostly involve self-defense evidence. See,
e.g., New Jersey v. Williams, 877 A.2d 1258 (N.J. 2005); State v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
48. Under the UMA, and most state law, there exist very few exceptions where something said during a
civil mediation could ever be used in a trial for the same civil action. The justifications for privilege in such a
scenario parallel the rationales for an absolute privilege for statements made during a criminal mediation when
offered in a criminal case on the same matter.
49. Williams, 877 A.2d 1258.
50. Id. at 1270.
5 1. Of course, this is also the difficult reality for every scenario where someone other than the declarant
testifies to a statement made during mediation, even when a mediator is subpoenaed to testify regarding
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UMA's criminal proceedings exception, even absent hearsay considerations, it is
unlikely that any communications from a mediation would ever be admissible
when testified to by the defendant, rather than the mediator or even the other
mediation participants.52 Regardless, the defense will always attempt to secure the
testimony of the mediator, as opposed to the defendant, in a case where the judge
permits evidence of the mediation communications, unless the mediator is
physically unavailable to testify or is otherwise made "unavailable" at law.53
Exculpatory circumstances are not always restricted to concurrent scenarios,
however. In Florida v. Castellano, the defendant was charged with attempted
first-degree murder and sought to subpoena a mediator's testimony concerning
the alleged victim's statements in mediation to support a claim of self-defense.54
The subject of the mediation was a previous altercation between the defendant
and the alleged victim. The defendant ultimately claimed that the mediator would
be able to testify that "during the course of the mediation the person who became
the victim of the alleged attempted murder made life-threatening statements to
the [defendant]."55 The court held that, because Florida did not have a statutory
statements made during mediation. In such scenarios, the disputants' statements would be inadmissible hearsay
as testified to through the mediator unless an exception somehow acted to take the evidence out of the hearsay
rule's grasp. See FED. R. EVID. 801, 802. The two most relevant exceptions, although still applied sparingly,
are: (1) "Statement against interest," found in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), where the declarant must be
unavailable (which is probable in this context due to either a mediation or Fifth Amendment privilege), the
statement must tend to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, and if criminal liability is the
"interest," then there must be other corroborating evidence; and (2) "Residual exception," found in Rule 807,
where a declarant's statement may fall into the rare catch-all category serving the interests of justice.
The problem in an exculpatory context, as opposed to when statements would be inculpatory and
introduced by the prosecution, is that the prevalent "Party-Opponent Admission" exception, which is
technically exempted from the hearsay definition by Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2). When statements are
made by the defendant in a mediation and used against the defendant in a later prosecution, the evidence would
constitute an "admission by [a] party-opponent" because a defendant is necessarily a "party" in a criminal
prosecution. However, even though it may be somewhat intuitive to consider an alleged victim in criminal case
as a "party" in addition to the government, courts have consistently held otherwise. See Willover v. State, 70
S.W.3d 841, 847 n. 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (addressing the question of whether the victim in a criminal case
is a party-opponent under the hearsay rule and citing various precedents holding that a victim is not a party).
Therefore, in a scenario where the defendant seeks to admit exculpatory statements made by an alleged
victim during a civil mediation, the evidence would be considered inadmissible hearsay unless falling within the
scope of the other exceptions discussed above. Notably, however, the lack of hearsay treatment in both cases
and writings discussing mediation privileges is quite puzzling. In fact, a text search of the IJMA reveals that the
word hearsay is completely absent from both the text and commentary of the Act.
52. The weight of the proffered evidence in these cases would almost never outweigh, let alone
substantially outweigh, the public's need for confidentiality in mediation because it is the criminal defendant
who is testifying. See infra Part IV.B (outlining the criminal proceedings exception for privileges under the
UMA). Furthermore, the negligible weight that a jury would attach to such testimony does not raise the same
degree of justice concerns under the circumstances.
53. However, hearsay problems would seem to remain a ubiquitous obstacle in the quest for
admissibility of even a mediator's testimony. See supra note 51 (addressing the hearsay issues that exist when
seeking to admit mediation communications).
54. See State v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
55. Id. at481.
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mediation privilege at the time, there was "no legal basis for a privilege which
would prevent the [defendant] from obtaining [the mediator's] testimony. 56
Finally, while this Article will focus more heavily on the constitutional rights
of the accused from an exculpatory perspective (rather than the State's need for
inculpatory evidence), society's evidentiary interest is more than just exculpatory
in nature. We may, as a society, make the conscious decision to err in favor of
acquitting the guilty rather than convicting the innocent, but this does not mean
that the interest in convicting the guilty should necessarily be subservient.57
Justice equates to condemnation of the guilty just as it translates to vindication of
the innocent. How we now frame the issue and the interests at stake inevitably
shapes the ultimate analysis when attempting to balance the scales.
III. CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE COURTS
All relationships and communications are not created equal. This recognition
may seem quite unremarkable, but as a characterization of how confidentiality
has developed in the law, it would act as a telling subtitle for Cliff's Notes on
Confidentiality. Whether for a lack of reliability or probative value, or for
reasons of public policy, and whether by means of statutory or common law, the
legal system has a storied-albeit convoluted-tradition of protecting the
confidential from entering the courtroom. However, as with most legal inquiries,
the question of exactly what relationships are most valued at law and to what
extent resulting communications are protected is most appropriately answered
with the classic lawyerly retort: "It depends." Although not entirely tangential to
the current discussion, in the interest of avoiding a synoptic digression on
confidentiality in the law, it is nevertheless sufficient, and worthwhile, to touch
58upon the most influential mechanisms employed by the courts in this area.
56. Id. at 482. Following the Castellano trial, in response to the court's call that "the legislature is the
proper branch of government from which to obtain the necessary protection," the Florida legislature passed a
statute that created a privilege for all parties in a mediation conducted by the Citizen Dispute Settlement Center
(CDSC). See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.201(5) (2003). In 2004, the privilege portions of the statute were deleted in
favor of a general mediation privilege, created in a different statute, that would still apply to CDSC mediations.
See id. § 44.405(2); Castellano, 460 So. 2d at 482. Notably, the old and new privileges, unlike the UMA, do not
confer a privilege upon the mediator; only when both parties waive their privilege do the mediations
communications become unprotected. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.405(4)(a)(1) (West Supp. 2007).
57. Hoeffel, supra note 28, at 1361 ("The criminal justice system was designed to reflect the most
undesirable verdict as that of the conviction of the innocent.").
58. The drafters of the UMA actually considered some of these other methods. See infra note 117
(discussing the alternative mechanisms considered by the UMA when deciding upon implementation of the
privilege structure).
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A. Historical Sources of Refuge
1. Contracting for Confidentiality
The first, and most easily understood, method of maintaining confidentiality
across a wide range of scenarios is the confidentiality agreement. However, this
frequently used tool is unfortunately of little consequence in the evidentiary
context. 9 Confidentiality agreements operate to keep another party from
disclosing information generally, and such disclosure may come with stiff legal
consequences, but the contractual right has no authority to affect the operation of
the judicial system. In other words, parties cannot contract to keep out evidence
in subsequent legal proceedings because this would effectively be a form of
private legislation. Nevertheless, confidentiality agreements maintain a
significant role in keeping private mediation communications out of public
discourse.6°
2. Rules for Excluding Evidence of Compromise
The second mechanism for protecting confidentiality, one that does operate
to exclude certain communications from court, is the rules of evidence.
Generally, there are many evidentiary rules that operate to exclude evidence,
including evidence that might be inadmissible due to lack of relevance, the
danger of unfair prejudice, hearsay limitations, or witness competency. One such
rule most germane to the domain of mediation confidentiality is Federal Rule of
Evidence 408.6' The "compromise discussion" exclusion of Rule 408 acts to
forbid evidence relating to negotiations of a disputed legal claim from
admissibility at trial.62 The rule has been justified on public policy grounds,
59. See supra note 5 (discussing the distinction between privileges, which operate to keep evidence out
of a legal proceeding, and confidentiality generally, which targets "outside" disclosure).
60. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 8 ("In some situations, parties may prefer absolute
non-disclosure to any third party, in other situations, parties may wish to permit, even encourage, disclosures to
family members, business associates, even the media. These decisions are best left to the good judgment of the
parties, to decide what is appropriate under the unique facts and circumstances of their disputes.... Such
confidentiality agreements are common in law, and are enforceable in courts." (emphasis added)).
61. See FED. R. EVID. 408. The text of FRE 408 reads:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or
promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim
which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or
invalidity of the claim or its amount, Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This
rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as
proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort
to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
Id.
62. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 429.
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primarily as a means of promoting a settlement-rich environment but also in
response to the fear that a jury could attach undue weight to communications that
"may be motivated by a desire for peace rather than from any concession of
weakness of position.""
Although courts have applied Rule 408, and comparable state statutes, to
negotiations regardless of whether a mediator is involved (i.e., the rule applies to
mediations), many lawyer mediators, as well as those in the ADR field, have
become increasingly wary, or at the very least uncertain, of the rule's protection
of mediation communications.' This concern is principally a function of what the
rule does not cover, including: mediations that do not involve actual and
unliquidated legal claims, discovery requests of the confidential communications,
and communications that are admissible for other purposes, such as proving bias
or prejudice of a witness, because the rule "excludes only when the purpose is
proving the validity or invalidity of the claim or its amount., 65 Accordingly, in
the interest of either expanded protection or at least greater predictability,
commentators have advised that "Rule 408's shortcomings in protecting
mediation communications provide justification for a mediation privilege and
suggest its design."66
3. Evidentiary Privileges
The final, and by far the most widely utilized, method of excluding
confidential communications from the evidentiary pool is the "privilege. ' 7
Despite the controversy that customarily surrounds evidentiary privileges, which
63. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note (discussing the reasons behind the rule); see also
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 429.
64. See, e.g., Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transition from Theory to Implementation:
Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, The Process and the Public
Interest, 1995 J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 13-14 (1995) ("Evidence Rule 408's weakness is that it does not require
exclusion of evidence from a negotiation offered for 'another purpose'. . . . Since mediation discussions tend to
be free flowing and often unguarded... [t]he 'another purpose' clause in the hands of creative counsel leaves
little in mediation definitely exempt from disclosure."). But see generally Charles W. Ehrhardt, Confidentiality,
Privilege, and Rule 408: The Protection of Mediation Proceedings in Federal Court, 60 LA. L. REV. 91 (1999);
id. at 126 ("Rule 408 clearly protects the confidentiality of mediation proceedings.").
65. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note; see also GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 429.
Because this Article is focused on the mediation privilege in criminal proceedings, it is important to note an
additional limitation that may exist as to the application of Rule 408. Assuming the mediation from which the
communications arise is not a criminal mediation, it is possible that the mediation communications would be
admissible "for another purpose," such as proving "the guilt of a criminal defendant." Id.
66. Kirtley, supra note 64, at 13. Interestingly, when assessing which mechanism would be most
effective to protect confidentiality, the UMA drafters considered "the extension of evidentiary settlement
discussion rules to mediation"-implying that such rules, including FRE 408, did not cover mediation
communications. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 4. The UMA passed on the idea of extending
settlement discussion rules because they proved "underbroad in that they failed to meet the reasonable needs of
the mediation process or the reasonable expectations of the parties in the mediation process." Id.; see also supra
note 117 (discussing other alternatives considered by the UMA to protect confidentiality).
67. See supra note II (defining the term "privilege").
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is a by-product of the perception by some that "privileges expressly subordinate
the goal of truth seeking to other societal interests, 68  the privilege structure
remains the preeminent mechanism because of its scope and flexibility.69 A
derivation of English common law, privileges first arose with the establishment
of the compulsory process-now guaranteed by the Sixth AmendmentT-which
created a right of the accused to call witnesses and the coinciding duty of those
witnesses to testify.7' The American privilege is now a labyrinth of
predominantly state statutory and federal common law that subverts this duty to
testify in the context of certain professional, social, or otherwise confidential
72relationships.
From the first recognition of an attorney-client privilege in the late sixteenth
century to the Supreme Court's announcement of a psychotherapist-patient
privilege only a decade ago,73 privileges have been extended to cover a myriad of
relationships over the course of the law's development.74 The specific policy
rationales offered to justify evidentiary privileges have endured over time,
despite continued assault from dissenters, including a large judiciary contingent,
who seek to limit the scope and impact of privileges.75 Supporters, and even some
courts, continue to focus principally on the cultivation of candor and encouraging
68. Developments in the Law-Privileged Communication: I. Introduction: The Development of
Evidentiary Privileges in American Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1454 (1985) [hereinafter Privileged
Communication I]. The controversy with evidentiary privileges is generally a function of their role. Unlike
many other procedural and evidentiary rules, which exclude evidence out on grounds of relevance or prejudice,
or "otherwise to aid in the truth-seeking function," privileges "impede the realization of a central objective of
the legal system in order to advance other, often less immediate, goals." Id.; see also Hughes, supra note 5, at
32-33 ("Most rules of evidence are intended to aid an adjudicative body's search for truth by distinguishing
unreliable information from more probative evidence; rules of privilege, in contrast, exclude information which
may be extremely helpful to the court in its search for the truth.").
69. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 4 ("The Drafters ultimately settled on the use of
the privilege structure, the primary means by which communications are protected at law, an approach that is
narrowly tailored to satisfy the legitimate interests and expectations of participants in mediation, the mediation
process, and the larger system of justice in which it operates.").
70. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing compulsory process under American constitutional law).
71. See Privileged Communication 1, supra note 68, at 1455-56 (tracing the privilege mechanism back to
the imposition of compulsory process in England).
72. States have slowly progressed to statutory privileges in the majority of scenarios. However, the
federal courts, as a result of FRE 501, maintain a common law approach to the enforcement of existing
privileges and the creation of new privileges. See FED. R. EVID. 501 ("[Tjhe privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.").
73. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
74. See generally Privileged Communication I, supra note 68 (discussing the development of the
American privilege). A quick look at California's Evidence Code reveals at least six readily identifiable
statutory privileges: lawyer-client, spousal, physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, clergy-penitent,
counselor-victim, and mediator-disputant. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 950-1037, 1115-28 (West 2005).
75. See Kirtley, supra note 64, at 3 ("These new rules of mediation privilege have emerged ... against
the current of judicial resistance to court created evidentiary privileges."); see also In re Parkway Manor Health
Care Ctr., 448 N.W.2d 116, 121 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) ("In view of the longstanding judicial hostility towards
evidentiary privileges ... ").
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effective communication,76 as well as recognizing a significant privacy interest, in
justifying the not insignificant role that privileges play in the judicial system."
But these policy precepts are symptomatic of a larger and more abstract
understanding of why privileges exist and operate potentially adverse to the
administration of justice.78 Privileges are "rooted in the imperative need for
confidence and trust, 79 that arises "when certain classes of relationships-or
certain classes of communications within those relationships-are deemed to be
so important to society that they must be protected."'
Although the exact breadth of exclusionary power does differ from privilege
to privilege, the basic operation of a privilege today allows the holder of the
privilege to prevent disclosure of certain confidential communications-in
court-via a right not to testify and the right to block other witnesses from
testifying, as well as the ability to exclude certain non-testimonial evidence. This
explanation of how privileges function highlights an important aspect of
privileges that may differ depending on the applicable law. Traditionally,
especially in the area of "professional" privileges, ownership of the privilege is
bestowed upon the client alone.8 ' This creates a dynamic where a waiver of
privilege by the client will force the "professional" to testify if called because the
client "holds" the privilege. However, this is one area where privileges for
mediation communications have sometimes deviated from the norm.82
B. Privileges for Mediation Communications
As the practice of mediation has continued to grow exponentially over the last
quarter-century, calls for increasing confidentiality in the process have dominated the
landscape of mediation legislation. Despite the opposition of a vocal but decided
minority, 3 the legislative manifestation of confidentiality has occurred primarily in
the form of privileges covering mediation communications. 8i Many scholars in the
76. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (recognizing that the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege is to "encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice").
77. See generally Privileged Communication: 11. Modes of Analysis: The Theories and Justifications of
Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1471 (1985) [hereinafter Privileged Communication Il].
78. See Scallen, supra note 11, at 538 ("Privileges do not in any way aid the ascertainment of truth, but
rather they shut out the light.").
79. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
80. Note, Parent-Child Loyalty and Testimonial Privilege, 100 HARV. L. REV. 910,911 (1987).
81. See infra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing how clients are the traditional holders of
privileges).
82. See infra notes 122-123 and accompanying text (addressing the UMA's approach to a mediation
privilege, which makes mediators holders of privilege, as well as parties).
83. See, e.g., Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL.
1 (1986); Scott H. Hughes, A Closer Look-The Case for a Mediation Confidentiality Privilege Has Not Been
Made, 5 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 14 (1998) [hereinafter A Closer Look].
84. See A Closer Look, supra note 83, at 14 ("Over the past two decades we have witnessed a vast
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field have advocated for the use of the privilege structure to protect confidentiality on
the same "party-candor" grounds that have traditionally justified other professional
privileges. 5 There are, however, additional rationales for a mediation privilege that
86are unique to the mediation context. The principle of maintaining mediator
neutrality is one such rationale that has remained at the forefront.87 The fear
surrounds a perceived loss of public trust that will allegedly result if mediators are
forced to testify adversely to mediation disputants."8
Notwithstanding the lack of an empirical nexus between confidentiality and
success of the mediation mechanism, 9 which has been a consistent point of
emphasis for those opposing the push for broader mediation privileges, 9°
lawmakers have nevertheless found the theoretical justifications for a mediation
privilege to be convincing. Legislatures have been persuaded by such rationales,
passing well over 250 privilege-related statutes now found within the large
majority of states.9' However, there has been very little uniformity among the
states in constructing their respective frameworks for mediation privileges.92
proliferation of mediation statutes throughout the United States, many of which contain privileges shielding the
mediator and/or the parties from the disclosure of events that take place during mediation, thus shrouding
mediation proceedings in a veil of secrecy.").
85. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note ("Such party-candor justifications for mediation
confidentiality resemble those supporting other communications privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege,
the doctor-patient privilege, and various other counseling privileges."); see also Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for
Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79,
80 n.6 (2001) [hereinafter Quest for Uniformity] (providing examples of commentators who support a mediation
privilege as the most effective method of protecting confidentiality).
86. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 429. The book addresses other reasons given to support a
mediation privilege, such as the fear that volunteer mediators will decrease in number if frequently called to
testify, that mediation will be used an informal discovery mechanism, and that the public confidence in
mediators may be jeopardized by their testimony and what would be perceived bias. Id.
87. See Quest for Uniformity, supra note 85, at 82 ("[C]onfidentiality is important for maintaining the
neutrality of the mediator. . . . [A] mediator who testifies will inevitably be seen as acting contrary to the
interests of one of the parties, which necessarily destroys her neutrality. It is true that this departure from
neutrality is not personal or intentional when a mediator is compelled to testify under subpoena. Nonetheless, if
a mediator can be converted into the opposing party's weapon in court, then her neutrality is only temporary
and illusory."); see also NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 55-56 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding, in the
context of labor mediations, that there is a "need for the appearance of impartiality," and that there is the
"potential for loss of that appearance through any degree of mediator testimony").
88. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note ("[Plublic confidence in and the voluntary use of
mediation can be expected to expand if people have confidence that the mediator will not take sides or disclose
their statements, particularly in the context of other investigations or judicial processes. The public confidence
rationale has been extended to permit the mediator to object to testifying, so that the mediator will not be
viewed as biased in future mediation sessions that involve comparable parties.").
89. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 429 ("Lawmakers have little evidence to guide them in
assessing whether assurance of confidentiality is necessary to promote the frank discussion necessary to achieve
settlement. Nor are there studies to buttress other arguments given for mediation confidentiality....").
90. See, e.g., A Closer Look, supra note 83, at 14 ("To begin with, it should be noted that there is almost
no empirical support for mediation privileges. ... [T]here is no empirical work to demonstrate a connection
between privileges and the ultimate success of mediation. Although parties may have an expectation of privacy,
no showing has been made that fulfilling this expectation is crucial to the outcome of mediation.").
91. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note ("Approximately half of the States have enacted
privilege statutes that apply generally to mediations in the State, while the other half include privileges within
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Privilege statutes for mediation communications have differed from one
another in several respects, including: "who may assert or waive the privilege
(the 'holders' of the privilege); exceptions to the privilege; what programs or
mediators are covered; and whether a court may order disclosure despite the
privilege where the need for the evidence outweighs the purpose served by
nondisclosure (whether the privilege is 'qualified' as opposed to 'absolute').,
93
An additional, and unquestionably crucial, area of divergence that has arisen
between the states involves the determination of a privilege's operational scope.
In other words, lawmakers have had to decide in what types of "proceedings"
should a mediation privilege apply. There are various proceedings to take into
account, such as judicial civil, judicial criminal, administrative, arbitral, motion
hearings, legislative hearings, as well as the discovery process.94 Whether
application of mediation privileges is appropriate in criminal proceedings and to
what extent they should apply-which is the subject of this Article-is by far the
most controversial question in this area because the answer carries with it the
greatest of implications.
1. Recognizing a Civil/Criminal Distinction
Because courts, as well as legislatures, acknowledge the potential for
injustice that exists whenever a privilege is recognized, the realities of the
criminal justice system significantly alter any equation where the need for
evidence resides on one side of the privilege scale. 95 The distinction between civil
and criminal proceedings that has been recognized and subsequently manifested
by lawmakers in their efforts to construct evidentiary privileges for mediation
communications is most often a function of the inherent differences between the
two independent systems and the distinct roles of each. The province of the
criminal justice system is of course to seek justice, and in so doing, a criminal
prosecution equates to society charging one of its own not only for harm against
a part-which is the sole province of the civil system-but rather for harm
against the whole, with the liberty or even life of the charged individual most
often in the balance.
This recognition of the unique and heightened domain occupied by the
criminal system applies with equal force in the current context, where the
systemic evidentiary need is pitted against a general need for confidentiality in
the provisions of statutes establishing mediation programs for specific substantive legal issues, such as
employment or human rights.").
92. See generally UNIF. MEDIATION AcT, Prefatory Note (discussing the state of non-uniformity that
exists with regard to legislation of mediation confidentiality).
93. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 429.
94. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 2(7) (addressing in what proceedings the UMA's
mediation privilege is applicable).
95. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 438 (acknowledging the potential for injustice with
mediation privileges).
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the mediative process. Indeed, even the drafters of the UMA-aithough only
carving out a relatively minor exception for criminal proceedings 6-conceded
that the respective strengths of the competing interests in the criminal setting
created a unique and troubling dynamic for constructing a privilege that would
apply in criminal proceedings.97 The drafters further conceded that even without
an exception for criminal proceedings, "the courts can be expected to weigh
heavily the need for the evidence in a particular case, and sometimes will rule
that the defendant's constitutional rights require disclosure." 98
The few courts that have addressed the application of mediation privileges to
criminal proceedings, as distinct from civil proceedings, have concluded that the
criminal setting demands a greater need for evidence. In the case that established
a federal mediation privilege, Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health
Plans, the court addressed this issue in dictum, noting that a mediation privilege
in the criminal context may prove a more difficult endeavor: "Although the Court
need not, and indeed may not, address the outer limits of a federal mediation
privilege, it seems appropriate to note one potential limitation here. A federal
mediation privilege may be attenuated of necessity in criminal or quasi-criminal
cases where the defendant's constitutional rights are at stake." 99
Another court even implicitly concluded that a juvenile delinquency
proceeding, defined as a "civil action," so resembled a criminal proceeding that
the analysis moved outside of a mediation privilege statute that applied only to
civil trials.'0° In Rinaker v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, the court held
that the defendant's constitutional rights were violated by prohibiting the
mediator's testimony, even though a California statute created a privilege for all
mediation communications sought as evidence in non-criminal proceedings.5 In
other words, the court took a "civil action" and proceeded with a balancing
analysis of defendant's constitutional rights as if the case was effectively a
criminal proceeding. The decision in Rinaker, as well as the statutory privilege at
issue that exempts criminal proceedings, illustrates the intuitive division that
exists between civil and criminal proceedings. However, although some courts
may recognize that a mediation privilege does not carry the same weight in
criminal settings as it would it civil, this sentiment of "criminal law is different"
has not translated into any uniformity with respect to privilege statutes and their
application to criminal proceedings, whether in the code books or the courts.
96. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the criminal proceedings exception in the UMA).
97. See UNIF. MEDIATION AcT, Official Comments, § 6(b)(1) (recognizing that "society's need for
evidence to avoid an inaccurate decision is greatest in the criminal context").
98. Id.
99. 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1178 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
100. See Rinaker v. Super. Ct. of San Joaquin County, 62 Cal. App. 4th 155 (1998). Perhaps this is what
the UMA envisioned-likely since the drafters cited to Rinaker-when noting an expectation that courts would
weigh a defendant's constitutional rights to introduce evidence regardless of a statutory privilege that may be in
place. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
101. Rinaker, 62 Cal. App. 4th at 164-67.
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2. Pre- UMA Treatment for Mediation Privileges in Criminal Proceedings
We are undoubtedly in an era where State support for confidentiality in
mediation is increasing. Nevertheless, the protections under state law, appro-
priately characterized as "uneven and lacking uniformity," reflect a collective
dissonance with respect to the scope of not only the need for confidentiality in
mediation, but also the right.0 2 "The unsettled state of the law reflects
disagreement among judges and legislators on the weight of competing
interests."'0 3 One area of divergence among states that resides at the forefront of
the confidentiality discussion relates to how states treat mediation privileges in
criminal proceedings, which is the principle jurisdiction of this Article.
State statutes that have extended a mediation privilege to preclude evidence
of mediation communications from criminal proceedings do not always make an
explicit distinction but rather include phrases of general application such as "any
proceeding" or "any subsequent legal proceeding."' 4 Others expressly apply to
civil and criminal cases. Whether implicit or expressly enumerated, state law
applying mediation privileges to both civil and criminal proceedings is
considered "consistent with existing privilege law and will undoubtedly be
interpreted to extend to such actions."'0 5
Of the state privilege statutes that do not apply to criminal proceedings, some
simply omit any reference to criminal proceedings when defining the statute's
scope by enumerating only civil or other non-criminal proceedings; others
explicitly exclude criminal proceedings from the privilege's coverage. Before the
construction of the UMA, "[v]ery few jurisdictions explicitly [applied] a
balancing test to the criminal proceedings exception."' 6 However, most of the
states that except criminal proceedings from their privilege's application limit the
exception to ongoing and future crimes only, thereby overtly rejecting the
admission of past criminal conduct, which is of primary concern when discussing
mediation privileges in a criminal context."07
102. Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661, 674 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (addressing the propriety of adopting a
federal mediation privilege protecting compelled mediator testimony, an analysis later taken up by the court in
Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, which adopted a federal mediation privilege).
103. Id. (citing Michael D. Young & David S. Ross, Confidentiality of Mediation Procedures, C879
ALI-ABA 571,578 (1993)).
104. See Joshua J. Engelbart, Note, Federal Mediation Privilege: Should Mediation Communications Be
Protected From Subsequent Civil & Criminal Proceedings?: In re: Grand Jury Subpoena Dated December 17,
1996, 1999 J. Disp. RESOL. 73, 78-79 (1999).
105. Kirtley, supra note 64, at 28.
106. Hiers, supra note 12, at 582.
107. It is unclear how such a statute would operate when a defendant is the proponent of evidence
offered for exculpatory purposes that neither pertains to past, current, or future criminal activity. See, e.g., State
v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1984). Defendant was charged with attempted first degree murder
and sought to subpoena a mediator's testimony concerning the alleged victim's statements in mediation to
support a claim of self-defense. Id. The UMA also provides a categorical exception for ongoing or future
crimes, in addition to the qualified exception for criminal proceedings generally. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, §§
6(a)(3)-(4) (The Reporter's Notes indicated that "this exception does not cover mediation communications
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The current state of mediation privileges in criminal proceedings-which
closely resembles the statutory landscape at the time of the UMA's introduction
only five years agog°S-is such that a mediator would be wise to avoid answering
questions regarding the confidentiality of mediations with respect to future
criminal proceedings, at least in any definitive sense. This is exactly the "notice"
problem that leaves parties at risk, a problem that the UMA pretends to solve. '°9
As noted by the UMA drafters, "[e]xisting privilege statutes are silent or split as
to whether they apply only to civil proceedings, apply also to some juvenile or
misdemeanor proceedings, or apply as well to all criminal proceedings."" 0 The
bottom line is that there was and there remains a widespread lack of uniformity
that is of paramount concern because of the notice issues that are heightened in
the criminal context and subsequently threaten to erode public confidence in
mediation.
IV. UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT
The rapidly expanding practice of mediation now occurs on many fronts,
both from a legal and jurisdictional standpoint, as well as from a communal and
cultural perspective. The aftermath has seen some collective dissonance in
defining the goals of mediation, determining party expectations, enforcing
institutional norms, and assessing how mediation should or does interact with the
judicial process."' Simply put, while the practice of mediation is undoubtedly
constituting admissions of past crimes, or past potential crimes, which remain privileged.").
108. Because the Act remains in its infancy, the states are far from adopting the UMA across the board.
But with nine states already placing the UMA in action and a handful with bills currently in their respective
legislatures, the UMA is certainly gaining favor. See infra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing state
adoption of the UMA).
109. The Reporter's Notes for the UMA's criminal proceedings exception indicates that the balancing
standard adopted by the UMA "puts the parties on notice" as to the limitation on confidentiality. UNIF.
MEDIATION AcT, Official Comments, § 6(b)(1). However, such after-the-fact balancing does not place the
parties in any better of a situation than if the UMA was silent on the issue. See infra Part V.B.2 (addressing the
ex post balancing problems raised by the UMA's balancing standard).
110. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 6(b)(1).
11. This apparent identity crisis in determining just what role mediation is supposed to play in the
bigger picture may underlie the recent push to, in a sense, rename what has traditionally been considered
"alternative dispute resolution," which encompasses a myriad of dispute resolution methods and processes. The
new "appropriate" dispute resolution is a recognition that while ADR is technically an alternative to the
courthouse, the almost staggering number of cases that settle prior to formal adjudication effectively renders
ADR the primary arena for resolution of disputes, with mediation and negotiation at the forefront.
Consequently, if "alternative" is an ADR misnomer-to the extent that "full-scale litigation, in the form of a
trial, is really the alternative"-this inevitably affects the perspective from which we approach mediation
because if mediation is used to settle a dispute that would otherwise reach formal adjudication, perhaps
mediation should, at the very least, leave in tact the expectations of parties with reference to their legal rights in
the judicial process. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Founders of
ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 2 n.6 (2000) (citing Albie Davis & Howard Gadlin, Mediators Gain
Trust the Old-Fashioned Way-We Earn It!, 4 NEGOT. J. 55, 62 (1988), as renaming the term ADR). But if
mediation is perceived as an independent form of dispute resolution altogether, a convention entirely or quasi-
disconnected from the legal system (leaving court-annexed ADR issues aside), the mandates of such an
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flourishing with decided utility, the institution of mediation is nevertheless
suffering from a lack of uniformity. This absence of umbrella regulation has
endured for decades at the potential expense of protecting party rights and
expectations and unquestionably contributed to the call for and eventual
construction of the UMA."'
The UMA, passed in its final form in 2001 and amended in 2003, was an
attempt by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law
(NCCUSL), in collaboration with the American Bar Association's Section on
Dispute Resolution, to create a uniform set of laws that "promotes predictability
and simplicity" in a complex area of the law to help "bring order and
understanding across state lines.""' The jury may be still out on the UMA's
success in fostering uniformity in the regulation of mediation, ' 4 but the
substantive approach of the NCCUSL in crafting the UMA's proposed legislation
has already, and not unexpectedly, seen its fair share of reasoned criticism, as
well as a legitimate swell of support. The primary commentator contingent has
focused on the true force of the UMA, which relates to how confidentiality is
regulated under the provisions of the Act through the use of privileges."5
The question posed in the beginning of this Article-asking to what extent
various mediation communications should be protected-strikes at the very heart
of any mediation privilege. Legislating on all fronts of mediation confidentiality,
the UMA's answer to this inquiry has implicated a wide range of competing
interests, the most dire of which is the criminal justice system's need for
evidence."6 The following discussion will first give a brief overview of how
institution would appear to be significantly altered by such a proclamation.
112. However, excessive regulation is legitimately frowned upon by many in the field who consider
flexibility and informal procedure as distinguishing characteristics of the mediation mechanism, relative to the
more formal judicial process. See, e.g., UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note ("[It is important to avoid laws
that diminish the creative and diverse use of mediation.").
113. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note. The UMA's "Prefatory Note" discusses various principles
behind its creation, the third of which is entitled "Importance of Uniformity." Id.
114. The recent trend has certainly shown that the UMA is gaining favor. See infra Part IV.C (discussing
adoption of the UMA by states). The UMA has been approved by the American Bar Association and endorsed
by the American Arbitration Association, Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service, CPR Institute for Dispute
Resolution, and the National Arbitration Forum. See Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About The
... Uniform Mediation Act, http://www.nccusl.orgIUpdate/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-uma200l.asp
(last visited February 17, 2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
115. Although the UMA does not contain "purpose" clauses, it does begin with a Prefatory Note
addressing the principles behind the Act. The first of these three broad principles is promoting candor: "The
Drafters intend for the Act to be applied and construed in a way to ... promote candor of parties through
confidentiality of the mediation process, subject only to the need for disclosure to accommodate specific and
compelling societal interests." UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note; see also Hughes, supra note 5, at 34-35
("There is no doubt that confidentiality (both keeping secrets and avoiding testimony) represents the principle
thrust of the UMA.").
116. Legislating on all fronts of mediation confidentiality would not be an entirely fair characterization
of the UMA's position. The large majority of the UMA deals with mediation confidentiality generally, but the
drafters recognized the important distinction between the confidentiality provided by evidentiary privileges,
which prevent disclosures in subsequent legal proceedings, and "outside" confidentiality, which in this context
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privileges work under the UMA and will then delve into the specifics of the
privilege exception for criminal proceedings, taking a look at how the states have
approached adoption of the Act's structure and standards.
A. The Privilege Framework
The first three substantive sections of the UMA construct the framework for
the mediation privilege. ' 7 Section 4 commences the privilege treatment by
establishing the scope of the privilege, as well as dictating who "owns" the
privilege. According to the Act, a mediation communication is privileged-and
is, therefore, not subject to discovery or admissible in evidence-to the extent
that every participant in a mediation may at least refuse to disclose, and may also
prevent any other participant from disclosing, their own communications." 8 Any
merely prevents disclosures outside of legal proceedings into the public sphere. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official
Comments, § 8 ("The evidentiary privilege granted in Sections 4-6 assures party expectations regarding the
confidentiality of mediation communications against disclosures in subsequent legal proceedings. However, it is
also possible for mediation communications to be disclosed outside of proceedings. ... Section 8 focuses on
such disclosures."). The drafters were cognizant of the fact that confidentiality "is viewed by many as the
lynchpin of mediation proceedings" and that "confidentiality of mediation communications against disclosures
outside of proceedings may be as important to the integrity of the mediation process for some as the protection
against disclosures of mediation communications in subsequent proceedings that is assured by the privilege." Id.
Nevertheless, the Act "takes an approach of restraint," leaving it up to the parties to assure "outside"
confidentiality because "[i]n some situations . .. parties may wish to permit, even encourage, disclosures to
family members, business associates, [and] even the media." Id.
The UMA's decision to stay away from the issue of "outside" confidentiality, instead leaving it to the
parties, might also have stemmed from concerns about having a statutory confidentiality provision that could
potentially hold liable a party who accidentally discloses mediation communications or did not know the
limitations. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 13, at 429, 447 ("Ultimately, the drafters were hesitant to impose
general confidentiality obligations through statute . . . noting that such a statute might penalize those where
were unaware of it .. "). This is most likely an implicit recognition of the lack of, or at best the very informal,
notice of legal rights often associated with mediation sessions. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments,
§ 8 ("As the drafts [for a confidentiality statute] grew in length and complexity, the Drafters became concerned
about the intelligibility and accessibility of the statute, which is particularly important given the important role
of non-lawyer mediators and the many people who participate in mediations without counsel or knowledge of
the law.").
117. The decision by the UIMA to utilize a mediation privilege as the preferred mechanism for protecting
confidentiality was the result of examining other possible approaches in relation to the privilege structure. The
alternatives and the reasons for not selecting other approaches was explained by the UMA:
The Drafters [of the UMA] considered several other approaches to mediation confidentiality-
including a categorical exclusion for mediation communications, the extension of evidentiary
settlement discussion rules to mediation, and mediator incompetency. Upon exhaustive study and
consideration, however, each of these mechanisms proved either overbroad in that they failed to
fairly account for interests of justice that might occasionally outweigh the importance of mediation
confidentiality (categorical exclusion and mediator incompetency), underbroad in that they failed to
meet the reasonable needs of the mediation process or the reasonable expectations of the parties in
the mediation process (settlement discussions), or under-inclusive in that they failed to provide
protection for all of those involved in the mediation process (mediator incompetency).
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 4.
118. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, §§ 4(a), (b) (2001). The UMA privileges apply to
all "mediation communications," defined as: "a statement, whether oral or in a record or verbal or nonverbal,
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further privilege rights bestowed by the UMA becomes a function of whose
communication is in controversy and, more importantly, which participant is
invoking the privilege. The breakdown is as follows:
1. A mediation party may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other
person from disclosing, a mediation communication.
2. A mediator may refuse to disclose a mediation communication and
may prevent any other person from disclosing a mediation
communication of the mediator.
3. A nonparty participant may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any
other person from disclosing, a mediation communication of the
nonparty participant. 9
This sliding scale of "blocking power" is a product of who is attempting to
"block" the disclosure, recognizing that the confidentiality interests of each
group-parties, mediators, and nonparty participants--carry less weight as the
analysis progresses down the scale.
However, the degree of privilege allocated across the board by the UMA
should not be overlooked. Unlike traditional evidentiary privileges, such as the
attorney-client privilege, the unique dynamic of a mediation results in at least
two parties holding an absolute privilege to block any disclosure of a mediation
communication. Therefore, unless all parties waive their absolute privilege, a
waiver by a single party has no effect, and that party would still be precluded
from introducing testimonial evidence relating to their own mediation• • 120
communications. Furthermore, the UMA's mediation privilege places a great
deal of power in the mediator's hands, which is also a divergence from the
approach conventionally taken with other "professional" privileges. 12' The
consequence of giving the mediator an absolute testimonial privilege is that even
that occurs during a mediation or is made for purposes of considering, conducting, participating in, initiating,
continuing, or reconvening a mediation or retaining a mediator." Id. § 2(2).
119. Id. §§ 4(b)(1)-(3) (emphasis added).
120. See id. § 5(a) ("A privilege under Section 4 may be waived in a record or orally during a
proceeding if it is expressly waived by all parties to the mediation .... ). It is important to note that although a
party may not disclose a mediation communication in a proceeding unless all parties waive their privileges, if
disclosure occurs anyway, that party is then precluded from asserting their privilege to the extent that the
harmed party must then disclose to remedy the situation-beyond any procedural cures the court might invoke,
such as asking the jury to disregard. See id. § 5(b) ("A person that discloses or makes a representation about a
mediation communication which prejudices another person in a proceeding is precluded from asserting a
privilege under Section 4, but only to the extent necessary for the person prejudiced to respond to the
representation or disclosure.").
121. Professional evidentiary privileges, including attorney-client and doctor-patient, are customarily
held by the actual party alone, not by the professional. But under the UMA, the mediator holds a testimonial
privilege identical to that held by the parties. See Hughes, supra note 5, at 36-37 ("[T]he idea of extending the
privilege to the agent or helper is unique among all of the professional relationships. The argument for a
separate privilege rests upon the continuing need for impartiality .... ").
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if both parties waive their privileges, the mediator can still refuse to testify
regarding any mediation communications. 22 The UMA justifies this decision in




If anything is readily ascertainable from studying the somewhat perplexing
framework of the UMA's privilege for mediation communications, it is the
realization that the overall impact of the privilege is unquestionably significant.
When looking at the scope of the privilege alone, without taking account of any
exceptions that may exist, it becomes immediately clear that the number of
circumstances where a privilege would fail to prevent disclosure in a legal
proceeding are few and far between. Consequently, the role that potential
exceptions to the broad privilege might play becomes compelling.
B. The Criminal Proceedings Exception
"As with other privileges, the mediation privilege must have limits ... [as]
exceptions primarily are necessary to give appropriate weight to other valid
justice system values ... ,,24 Section 6 of the UMA, considered to be the "key to
understanding" the Act, enumerates an extensive list of exceptions that operate to
prevent invocation of the mediation privilege.' 25 The "laundry list" of specific
exceptions addressed in subsection (a) cover everything from sunshine laws and
mediator malpractice to ethical disclosure requirements and criminal conduct-• 126
within the mediation. They are categorical exceptions that apply without
discretion on the part of the court because, according to the drafters, "society's
interest in the information contained in the mediation communications may be
said to categorically outweigh its interest in the confidentiality of mediation
communications.' 27
122. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 5(a)(l) ("A privilege ... may be waived ... if it is expressly waived
by all parties to the mediation and ... in the case of the privilege of a mediator, it is expressly waived by the
mediator .. "). This circumstance, where both parties waive their mediation privileges but the mediator does
not, occurred in Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999) and highlights the impact
of a mediator-held privilege. In Olam, the parties explicitly waived their privilege and requested that the court
consider evidence about what occurred during an earlier mediation, which would inevitably include testimony
from the mediator, in order for the court to resolve a motion to enforce a settlement agreement. The decision by
Magistrate Brazil-a well-known scholar in the ADR field-held that "the mediator's testimony was essential
to doing justice [in the case]." Id. at 1139. But Judge Brazil also noted that "[i]f a party to the mediation were
objecting to compelling the mediator to testify [the court] would be faced with a substantially more difficult
analysis." Id. at 1133.
123. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 4(b) ("Mediators are made holders with respect
to their own mediation communications, so that they may participate candidly, and with respect to their own
testimony, so that they will not be viewed as biased in future mediations .. .
124. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note.
125. See Hughes, supra note 5, at 38 ("The key to understanding the UMA can be found in section 6
which contains the exceptions to the privileges created in section 4.").
126. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 6(a).
127. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 6.
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Conversely, and interestingly, the more general exceptions under subsection
(b), which is where the exception for criminal proceedings resides, require
balancing on the part of the trial court because the relative strengths of the
interests-the need for evidence versus mediation confidentiality-"can only be
measured under the facts and circumstances of the particular case.' 28 While this
approach might seem to lend to a preponderance standard, where the evidence
would come in if the evidentiary need outweighed the interest in confidentiality,
this is simply not the case under UMA. Instead, subsection (b) creates a burden
of proof upon the proponent of the evidence that is significantly more difficult to
satisfy:
(b) There is no privilege under Section 4 if a court.., finds, after a
hearing in camera, that the party seeking discovery or the proponent of
the evidence has shown that the evidence is not otherwise available, that
there is a need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest
in protecting confidentiality, and that the mediation communication is
sought or offered in ... a court proceeding involving a felony [or
misdemeanor]....29
Although the drafters recognized that the cases in which this exception may
arise are indeed rare, they nevertheless contend that in the situations which
implicate the exception the evidence in controversy "should remain confidential
but for overriding concerns for justice."'30
The procedural operation of the privilege exception for criminal proceedings
is rather simple, though the determination by the court may prove more difficult.
As indicated in the provision above, to effectuate the exception, the moving party
must first demonstrate to the court that the evidence is not attainable by other
non-privileged means.'' Next, the moving party must make a showing-in
camera-that the need for the evidence substantially outweighs the interest in
confidentiality. As with most subjective legal standards, there is lack of guidance
as to the quantification of such a high standard, and it is therefore left up to the
court to determine what type of showing is necessary to meet the burden.1
128. Id.
129. Id. § 6(b)(1) (emphasis added) (bracketed text in original).
130. UNIF. MEDIATION Acr, Official Comments, § 6.
131. It is important to note here that just because evidence is "otherwise available" does not necessarily
mean what the literal reading of the words may suggest. Most often, evidence in this context is testimonial and
just because another witness may be able to provide similar testimony does not equate to equal testimony. As
courts have recognized, especially in the mediation context, "the testimony of a disinterested [witness], i.e., the
mediator, may carry more weight of credibility." Rinaker v. Super. Ct. of San Joaquin County, 62 Cal. App. 4th
155, 165 (1998). In other words, the testimony of a mediator is not always disallowed simply because the
testimonial evidence offered by the mediator is attainable by some other means or witness.
132. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACr, Official Comments, § 6(b)(1) ("After great consideration and public
comment, the Drafting Committees decided to leave the critical balancing of these competing interests to the
sound discretion of the courts to determine under the facts and circumstances of each case."). Presumably a
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An important issue that the UMA leaves to the states when considering
adoption of the Act is whether the criminal proceedings exception should apply
to all criminal trials or only felony cases.'33 The language of the provision does
allow for the addition of misdemeanors to the exception's coverage.14
Nevertheless, as the UMA stands, the exception for criminal proceedings only
applies in felony settings. The significance of this limitation is that in
misdemeanor cases, the default categorical privilege under the UMA would be in
effect, save application of a subsection (a) exception. Of course, states do have
the final decision in choosing whether to adopt the UMA, and in doing so, they
have the ability to determine the ultimate scope of the Model Act through
modifying the legislation or enacting it in totality. Not surprisingly, different
states have elected to take different paths.
C. State Adoption and Modification
At present, there are nine states that have adopted the UMA in some form
and a few more that have introduced UMA bills in their respective legislatures.'
35
The states that have adopted the Act to this point-District of Columbia, Illinois,
Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Utah, Vermont, and Washington-have
almost universally traced the exact structure, language, and substance of the
UMA. Looking at the treatment of mediation privileges, and the exceptions that
exist in criminal proceedings more specifically, the adopting states have not
deviated much from the UMA's approach. However, differences do exist among
the states, primarily in relation to the decision of applying the exception in
misdemeanor cases.
Of the nine states that have codified the UMA, four states have chosen to
allow application of the exception only in felony cases, following the direct
guidance of the Model Act. 136 Consequently, in these states, the mediation
court, following the customary balancing process in the evidentiary context, would take into consideration how
probative the evidence is and how reliable the evidence may prove. See, e.g., Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68
F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1138-39 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (discussing the reliability and probative value of a mediator's
testimony in the civil trial context). In fact, the UMA ultimately chose to construct a privilege framework,
rather than implementing other means of protecting confidentiality, because the structure "provides greater
certainty in judicial interpretation because of the courts' familiarity with other privileges...." UNIF. MEDIATION
ACT, Official Comments, § 4.
133. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 6(b)(1) ("[T]he Act affords more specialized
treatment for the use of mediation communications in subsequent felony proceedings, which reflects the unique
character, considerations, and concerns that attend the need for evidence in the criminal process. States may
also wish to extend this specialized treatment to misdemeanors, and the Drafters offer appropriate model
language for states in that event.").
134. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (providing the text of the provision).
135. See generally Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About the Uniform Mediation Act
(2001)(2003), http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uma200l.asp (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
136. See 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/6(b)(1) (West Supp. 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2935(b)(1) (West
Supp. 2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.07.050(2)(a) (2005). New Jersey's offense classifications do not follow the
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privilege remains intact for non-felony proceedings-save the categorical
exceptions.' Four states have made the decision to permit the exception to
operate in misdemeanor cases as well felonies.'38 Each of these six states have
maintained the UMA's "substantially outweighs" standard dictating whether or
not evidence will come in under the privilege exception in each particular case.39
While states have maintained a certain degree of uniformity in their adoption
of the UMA, one state's departure has been much more significant, at least in
terms of substantive impact. The Ohio framework not only introduces a unique
burden of proof applied to the exception analysis, but also alters the treatment of
the privilege exceptions for felony and misdemeanor proceedings entirely.
' °
Instead of following the qualified privilege for felony criminal proceedings under
the UMA, Ohio shifts the felony proceeding exception into the categorical
exceptions. Consequently, there is no mediation privilege in the context of a
felony case within Ohio, which means that mediation communications are not
protected. Furthermore, while Ohio does include a qualified exception for
misdemeanor proceedings, they utilize a "manifest injustice" standard rather than
a "substantially outweighs" burden of proof. These deviations, especially the
blanket exception for felony proceedings, could potentially have a considerable
impact on a criminal case in Ohio when mediation communications are offered as
evidence.
4'
V. WEIGHING THE INTERESTS AND TIPPING THE SCALES
Notwithstanding the reality that evidence lies at the very foundation of our
justice system, it is, of course, commonplace for courts to balance interests
pertaining to the admissibility of evidence. After all, courts look at the relevance,
probative value, and prejudicial nature of evidence on a daily basis in their
attempt to determine whether evidence should be admitted. Therefore, the idea
that courts should need to balance other interests, such as confidentiality in
mediation, is certainly not a foreign one. Traditionally, however, these balancing
classic felony/misdemeanor distinction. Instead, offenses are classified as "crimes" if they authorize a sentence
in excess of six months imprisonment--traditionally a felony-and "disorderly offenses" when less than six
months of imprisonment is possible-traditionally a misdemeanor. The privilege exception for mediation
communications in New Jersey applies only to "crimes," and, therefore, the state's approach is in line with the
UMA in only allowing an exception for felony proceedings. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23C-6(b)(1) (2006) (the
privilege applies only in "a court proceeding involving a crime as defined in the 'New Jersey Code of Criminal
Justice'...."); see also id. § 2C: 1-4 (2006) (defining the classes of offenses in New Jersey).
137. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text (addressing the UMA's categorical privilege
exceptions).
138. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4205(b)(3) (2006); IOWA CODE § 679C.106(2)(a) (2005); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-31c-106 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5717 (2006); see also supra note 133 (providing the
reporter's notes on the issue of applying the exception to felonies and misdemeanors).
139. See supra notes 129-132 and accompanying text (discussing the burden of proof under the UMA).
140. See OHiO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2710.05(A)(9), (B)(1) (2006).
141. See infra Part VI.B (discussing the merits of the Ohio approach).
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calculations are not performed de novo, but rather with significant deference or
benefit of the doubt given to the systemic need for evidence. But the UMA's
approach provides the counter position to this convention.
As Dean Wigmore illustrated in his oft-cited pro ' 42 tAs Dan r t  t te proposition, he default
position for evidence in our system is admissibility; our courts do not work from
a baseline of determining what evidence should be allowed to come in but rather
what evidence should not come in. But what the Supreme Court has recognized
as a "general rule disfavoring testimonial privileges"' 143 can be overcome where
there is present a "public good transcending the normally predominant principle
of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth."'" Maintaining
confidentiality in mediation is undoubtedly a "public good." Consequently, the
debate shifts to whether and in what circumstances this public good "transcends"
the truth-seeking function and when it does not.
A. Mediation Confidentiality vs. Criminal Justice
Discussing and debating the interests behind a criminal proceedings
exception-the need for evidence versus the need for mediation confidentiality-
is something that can occur in the abstract. In practice, however, the balancing
occurs not between the general need for evidence and confidentiality, but
between the general need for confidentiality and the particular need for specific
evidence in any given criminal proceeding. In other words, one interest is
weighed from a macro perspective while the other is weighed from a micro
perspective. Therefore, the best way to illustrate how a criminal proceedings
exception operates is to apply the exception in the context of an actual case.1
45
The facts of the "hypothetical" case are as follows:
Carl and his brother-in-law BB became involved in a bitter feud
because of family problems. BB began taunting Carl by leaving profane
messages over the telephone. BB's actions led to a physical altercation.
Carl alleged that BB hit him on the shoulder with a shovel. BB claimed
that Carl retrieved a machete from his truck and proceeded to cut BB's
wrist. Police subsequently arrested Carl after finding an unsheathed
machete in his apartment and the sheath on the front yard of BB's house.
Carl was charged and indicted on one count of aggravated assault and
two counts of weapons possession.
142. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (providing the statement of Dean Wigmore).
143. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996). In this case, the Court departed from the default rule
disfavoring testimonial privileges when they established the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Id.
144. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
234 (1960)).
145. I recognize, of course, that the factual circumstances chosen will inevitably shape the ultimate
analysis, as it does in practice.
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However, after his arrest and before his indictment, Carl filed a civil
complaint against BB for harassment resulting from the earlier phone
messages. The action was referred to mediation, but the parties were
unable to resolve the harassment dispute. At his assault trial, Carl
asserted a claim of self-defense and proffered the civil mediator as a
witness. During an in camera session regarding admission of the
mediation communications proffered by Carl, the mediator admitted to
the court that BB stated in the mediation session that he had wielded the
shovel against Carl during the original altercation. Nevertheless, the
court excluded the mediator's testimony, and the defendant was
convicted of third-degree aggravated assault and weapons possession.
In looking at the scenario posed, it is immediately apparent that the evidence
at issue is exculpatory in nature. The evidence is essentially testimony by the
mediator that will reveal an admission by the alleged victim, BB, that he wielded
the shovel during the altercation. It is important to remember that Carl would
undoubtedly make the self-defense claim regardless of the mediator's testimony,
but testimony from Carl to that effect would carry only a fraction of the weight
that the mediator's testimony would carry. 146 The bottom line is that a neutral
third-party will always be more believable to the jury than a criminal defendant,
and the evidence would, therefore, prove more probative. So with that in mind,
the ultimate question is whether the mediator's testimony should be allowed?
Under the UMA's exception, the balancing test would ask: Does the need for
the mediator's testimony substantially outweigh the interest in protecting
confidentiality?14 7 Presumably, the judge would look first to reliability and
probative value in order to assess the weight that should be attached to the
evidence. 4 8 It certainly appears that the evidence in the hypothetical has at least
some probative value. In a basic "he said-he said" assault case, the testimony of
an impartial mediator revealing that the alleged victim was at least a party to the
aggression, if not the primary aggressor, has the potential to be quite potent. If
the jury hears a mediator say that the victim threatened the defendant with a
shovel during the fight, there is a good chance that the self-defense claim might
lead to exoneration. Of course, there is no way to know this for sure, but it is safe
to say that the mediator's testimony is highly probative.
As far as the reliability of the testimony is concerned, there was some
indication during the in camera hearing that the mediation session was very
heated and that it was difficult to hear exactly what was said and who said it at all
times during the mediation. But the trustworthiness of the mediator is not in
146. See supra note 131 (discussing the intricacies of the "otherwise available" requirement).
147. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (providing the language of the UMA exception).
148. See Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1138-39 (N.D. Cal. 1999). The court
indicated that probative value and reliability were important in stating that "there was a substantial likelihood
that testimony from the mediator would be the most reliable and probative on the central issues ..... Id.
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doubt and the reliability, even with the concern indicated, is fairly strong relative
to other testimony that is often given by partial eyewitnesses in assault cases. It is
important to note, however, that there are a substantial number of other issues in
the hypothetical that could presumably affect the balancing equation, but the idea
here is to get a general sense of what a balancing test might look like in practice.
With the weight of the evidence now apparent, we are forced to determine
whether the value of that evidence to this particular case is substantially greater
than the value that confidentiality has in mediation. Mediation undoubtedly
depends on confidentiality to a very significant degree. Without confidentiality,
there would be no candor. Without candor, the very purpose of mediation is
compromised. Furthermore, the testimony of mediators affects the appearance of
impartiality that exists in the mediation profession. If mediators regularly testify
about communications made during a mediation session, which inevitably favors
one party or at least places one party in a better light, then the public will lose
confidence in the mediation institution because the perception of impartiality will
diminish or even disappear. These are grave concerns that merit very serious
consideration in every case.
Accordingly, we are clearly left with a very troublesome decision, one that I
am sure many judges can attest to. So how do we decide? The need for the
exculpatory evidence is powerful, but is it stronger than the confidentiality
interest? Or more accurately, does it substantially outweigh the need for
mediation confidentiality? Conversely, the need for confidentially is compelling,
but is the fear that breaking confidentiality in this one case will affect the entire
practice of mediation worth convicting a potentially innocent victim? What if
you were the defendant? What if you were the alleged victim? What if you were
the mediator? What the preceding analysis reveals is that even in a simplified fact
pattern, the balancing of the two competing interests is extremely difficult. There
is only one question left: Is the mediator's testimony admissible or inadmissible?
The case discussed above is a simplified version of State v. Williams,'49 the
"first decision issued by a state high court interpreting the Uniform Mediation
Act's evidentiary balancing test."' 50 Although New Jersey had not yet adopted the
UMA at the time of the original action, the New Jersey Supreme Court chose to
utilize the UMA as an "appropriate analytical framework."'' 5' The trial court in
Williams excluded the mediator's testimony because of a statutory privilege and
was affirmed by the appellate court. The New Jersey Supreme Court underwent a
balancing test in order to determine if the defendant's asserted constitutional
rights-confrontation, compulsory process, and due process-overrode the need
149. 184 N.J. 432 (2005).
150. New York State Dispute Resolution Assoc., Court Upholds Mediation Confidentiality in Case
Testing the Uniform Mediation Act, http://www.nysdra.org/articles/articledetails.asp?ID= 125 (last visited
February 17, 2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
151. Williams, 184 N.J. at 444-45.
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for confidentiality in mediation that was protected by the presence of a statutory
privilege under New Jersey law.'52
In beginning the analysis, the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged the
strong interests on both sides of the case. The court first established that "if
evidence is relevant and necessary to a fair determination of the issues, the
admission of the evidence is constitutionally compelled."' 5 3 But the court also
recognized that "[s]uccessful mediation ... depends on confidentiality perhaps
more than any other form of ADR" and "[i]f mediation confidentiality is




Ultimately, the New Jersey Supreme Court sided with "the sound policy
justifications underlying mediation confidentiality" and held that the defendant's
"need for the mediator's testimony [did] not outweigh the interest in mediation
confidentiality . . . ""'5 However, the court's decision undoubtedly rested upon
other factors not discussed in the earlier case analysis, including reliability
problems with the mediator's testimony, lack of corroboration between the
mediator's proposed testimony and defendant's version of the altercation, and a
conclusion by the court that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the evidence
in question was not otherwise available.
The Williams case also provides a great illustration of how judges can split
with regards to balancing the competing interests in identical circumstances.
The dissent in Williams essentially agreed with the standards applied by the
majority but disagreed with the majority's conclusions "regarding the 'need' for
the mediator's testimony," recognizing that such conclusions are certainly "fact-
sensitive."'56 The dissent also departed because of a disagreement involving
whether the evidence was "otherwise available." The dissent argued that all the
evidence and testimony regarding the alleged victim's wielding of a shovel
came from "interested" parties and, therefore, the evidence was not otherwise
available because the "mediator's position as the only objective witness placed
him in an entirely distinct role from the other witnesses in the case."'57 The
dissent's ultimate conclusion was very telling with respect to the emotions of
these cases and the difficulties involved:
There is nothing unclear about [the] testimony. Plainly, [BB] admitted, in
the mediator's presence, to wielding a shovel. That, in turn, rendered the
152. Id. at 443-44.
153. Id. at 444 (quoting State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 171 (2003)).
154. Id. at 447.
155. Id. at 454. The court did realize that the UMA standard was actually "substantially outweighs," as
opposed to just "outweighs," but concluded nonetheless that it did not matter because "the mediator's testimony
[did] not outweigh-let alone substantially outweigh-the interest in protecting confidentiality." Id. at 445-46.
Notably, the defendant argued that the "substantially outweighs" standard was unconstitutional and that the
court should apply an "outweighs" standard instead. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
156. Williams, 184 N.J. at 454.
157. Id. at 455. See also supra note 131 (discussing the intricacies of the "otherwise available"
requirement).
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mediator's testimony "relevant and necessary" to the defense .... Indeed,
[the testimony] could have turned the tide of a very close case.
Therefore, it was essential both to the defense of the criminal charges
against defendant and to the very fairness of the trial. That was a
sufficient basis on which to breach the mediator's privilege.
58
Finally, what the balancing analysis undertaken in Williams further illustrates
is how changing the balancing variables can dramatically affect the equation and
the outcome. How would a burden different from "substantially outweighs," such
as a preponderance standard ("outweighs"), affect your analysis and ultimate
decision? What if the evidence was inculpatory? What if the alleged victim (BB)
testified at Carl's trial and stated that he never had a shovel?" 9 What if both
parties agreed to waive their privilege but the mediator still refused to testify?'.
These are just a few of the quandaries that accompany any discussion of the
enigmatic framework that is civil mediation privileges in the criminal arena.
B. Why the UMA Got it Wrong
I certainly do not pretend to know the answers to any of the questions I have
posed in the preceding section, at least not in any absolute sense. I also am not
suggesting that these are questions that have right or wrong answers, because
they most often do not. What I will suggest is that the need for evidence in
criminal cases is not treated seriously enough by the UMA, as manifested in the
adopted standard. The reporter's notes use language that appears deferential not
only to the need for evidence in criminal cases, but also to the special
158. Williams, 184 N.J. at 455-57.
159. This question, of course, implicates the issue of impeachment evidence. The use of mediation
communications strictly for impeachment purposes can be seen as somewhat of a compromise in the privilege
battle that is waged between advocates of strict confidentiality and those in favor of greater disclosure.
Impeachment in the mediation privilege context is similar to the traditional use of criminal impeachment where
certain otherwise inadmissible evidence is permitted as a means to impeach a defendant who chooses to testify
in his or her defense. However, in the mediation context, evidence that arises during a civil mediation can be
utilized as a means of impeachment, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, and whether the witness to be
impeached is the defendant or perhaps even the victim (e.g., victim testifies that defendant attacked him first,
but mediation testimony reveals that the victim was the aggressor).
When discussing the ideas for this article in front of a class of law students in a mediation clinic, many
were very receptive to the idea of allowing mediation evidence to be used for impeachment purposes but were
instinctually critical of rules that would allow for the admission of mediation evidence generally in criminal
trials. This demonstrates the natural inclination toward compromise, where limiting the use for impeachment
purposes only may seem like a fair middle ground for the mediation privilege debate. What role impeachment
plays in the admissibility of mediation communications, assuming an impeachment distinction is prudent at all,
is an important issue to consider in any privilege discussion. See infra Part VI.B (proposing an amended statute
for the UMA that distinguishes evidence used for impeachment purposes only).
160. See supra note 122 (discussing the holding by Judge Brazil in Olam that based the decision to
admit the mediator's testimony, at least to some degree, on the fact that both parties in the case waived their
mediation privileges).
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constitutional concerns that attend the need for exculpatory evidence. 6 However,
this amounts to nothing more than lip service because the balancing deference is
undeniably aimed at the confidentiality interest alone, and there is no special
treatment for exculpatory evidence.
The following will detail why the UMA's approach to a criminal proceedings
exception is misguided. First, the UMA balancing standard is weighted too
greatly against evidentiary needs. Second, the distinction made between felonies
and misdemeanors is not prudent in the context of evidentiary privileges. Finally,
the lack of a distinction between inculpatory and exculpatory evidence fails to
account for the constitutional rights of the accused.
1. Burden of Proof Too Much of a Burden
When the drafting committee for the UMA first addressed the idea of
creating an exception to what was, in the beginning, an absolute mediation
privilege, they adopted an "interests of justice" standard that was effectively a• 162
catch-all exception. But this exception would not last long and was eventually
replaced by a more refined balancing test that focused on preventing "manifest
injustice,"'' 63  which was ironically modeled after Ohio law on mediation
privileges.'64 The drafters believed that the early manifest injustice standard
would only allow the admissibility of evidence in "exigent, unforeseen, or
exceptional" circumstances' 65 and believed that the high threshold would keep out
most evidence of mediation communications: "Given the fundamental nature of
advocacy, the Drafting Committee anticipates that many if not most such claims
of manifest injustice will fail.',166 However, a large contingent of critics quickly
crawled out of the woodwork against the proposed exception fearing that it
"would open the floodgates of litigation."' 167
161. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 6(b)(1).
162. Draft UMA, Apr. 1998, Reporter's Working Notes (c)(10).
163. Draft UMA, Mar. 1999, Reporter's Working Notes (d)(8). The entire standard originally read: "to
prevent a manifest injustice of such magnitude as to outweigh the importance of protecting the ...
confidentiality in mediation proceedings." Id.
164. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02.3(C) (1998). This statute, which has now been amended
upon adoption of the UMA, previously read that a mediation privilege did not apply where "necessary in a
particular case to prevent a manifest injustice, and that the necessity for disclosure is of a sufficient magnitude
to outweigh the importance of protecting the general requirement of confidentiality in mediation proceedings."
Id. This is ironic because Ohio has now adopted the UMA framework but drastically altered the criminal
proceedings exception by creating a categorical exception for felony proceedings and a "manifest injustice"
balancing standard for misdemeanor proceedings.
165. Draft UMA, Dec. 1999, Reporter's Working Notes 2(c)(5).
166. Id.
167. Hughes, supra note 5, at 55-57 (providing a very thorough timeline of how the criminal
proceedings exception developed under the UMA, including a detailed account of critics voicing discontent
during the process).
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Although the drafters tried to save the basic "manifest injustice" framework
by undergoing several reworks, the exception eventually gave way to the
contemporary "substantially outweighs" balancing test.'68 Surprisingly, the
mediation community did not organize against the new exception, which appears
wrought with the same problems of the old. In fact, except for those few critics
who wanted to rid the UMA of any balancing calculations altogether, the
"substantially outweighs" test was embraced by most followers. In 2001, it
became the standard under which a new criminal proceedings exception would
be measured.
As this Article has repeated ad nauseam, for the admissibility of mediation
communications in felony proceedings, the criminal proceedings exception in the
UMA now requires that "the party seeking discovery or the proponent of the
evidence has shown ... that there is a need for the evidence that substantially
outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality.' 69 The problems with the
"substantially outweighs" burden of proof, and the reasons why it is too high, are
three-fold.
First and foremost, the balancing standard under the UMA is an uncon-
stitutional threshold as applied to exculpatory evidence. The constitutional rights
of the criminal defendant are of the utmost importance in any evidentiary
equation. The ability of the accused to call witnesses in their favor (compulsory
process), to cross-examine and impeach the government's witnesses
(confrontation), and to receive a fair opportunity to present a defense (due
process) are absolutely imperative to ensure that truth is revealed, the innocent
protected, and justice served. 7 ° The UMA standard, which places a strong benefit
of the doubt in favor of inadmissibility, violates the Constitution because it forces
courts to balance from an uneven starting point. '7 In creating a "substantially
outweighs" test, the UMA approach universally places the interests of mediation
above the interests of justice and the constitutional rights of the accused.
It is not the case that the drafters of the UMA failed to take notice of the
constitutional rights at stake. This could not be further from the truth. Instead, the
UMA intentionally renders the constitutional rights of an accused subservient to
the need for confidentiality. In fact, the reporter's notes state: "[E]ven without
this exception, the courts can be expected to weigh heavily the need for the
evidence in a particular case, and sometimes will rule that the defendant's
constitutional rights require disclosure."' 7 This is effectively a concession, on
168. See id.
169. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(b)(1) (emphasis added).
170. See supra Parts ilI.B.1-2 (discussing the constitutional rights implicated with evidentiary
privileges).
171. The defendant in Williams likewise believed that "the qualifier 'substantially' represents an
unconstitutional evidentiary restriction" and that the court should have considered "only whether the need
'outweighs' the confidentiality interests, a standard that is less burdensome...." New Jersey v. Williams, 877
A.2d 1258, 1265 (N.J. 2005).
172. UNIF. MEDIATION AcT, Official Comments, § 6(b)(1).
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some level, that the constitutional rights at stake in criminal proceedings will in
some cases render the application of a mediation privilege unconstitutional.
But even with this recognition, the UMA exception creates only a very small
window of admissibility. In other words, if the constitutional issues involved are
such that a statutory mediation privilege would not survive an as-applied
constitutional challenge, then an exception that only permits the admission of
exculpatory evidence in the rarest of cases-as was the documented purpose
behind the UMA exception' 73-treads on very shaky constitutional grounds.
Although the courts have consistently recognized other evidentiary privileges as
categorically constitutional, this argument fails to account for the inescapable
differentiation between the policy interests implicated by such privileges and the
interest in mediation confidentiality that provides the bedrock for the mediation
privilege. There is no doubt that mediation is a vital institution that benefits
millions of people. The interests involved may be sufficient to support a broad
privilege in civil settings, but the constitutional rights that attend any criminal
proceeding demand a significantly higher level of respect and deference.
Furthermore, not only are the needs for exculpatory evidence immeasurably
greater in the criminal context relative to evidence proffered in a civil action, but
the interests of mediation confidentiality are significantly lower than in a civil
context. Unlike in a civil action, the use of exculpatory evidence in a criminal
trial is not adverse to any party. The need for confidentiality is based largely on
the fear that a lack of confidentiality will translate to a lack of candor. But if a
party is not concerned about having their statements used against them legally,
then they are not going to be discouraged from speaking openly during
mediation. 74 The chilling effect just is not there.' Moreover, and for the very
same reasons, the alternative interest supporting mediation confidentiality,
impartiality of the mediator, is also implicated to a lesser extent when the
proffered evidence is exculpatory in nature.
Therefore, because the constitutional interests are so high on the evidentiary
side when dealing with exculpatory evidence, and the need for confidentiality is
lower relative to proffering of other non-exculpatory evidence, the UMA's
"substantially outweighs" standard does not pass constitutional muster. A
categorical exception for exculpatory evidence may certainly be the answer, but
the constitutional rights at stake at the very least demand a preponderance
standard that will allow the courts to weigh each interest from equipoise.
173. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 6(b) ("[T]he exceptions listed in 6(b) include
situations that should remain confidential but for overriding concerns [of] justice,"); see also supra note 166
and accompanying text (revealing that the UMA was attempting to draft a standard that would effectively keep
all evidence out but for the absolute rarest of cases).
174. See infra notes 196-198 and accompanying text (discussing the idea that exculpatory evidence is
not legally adverse to any mediation party).
175. But see Hiers, supra note 12, at 584 ("Any criminal proceedings exception to the mediation
privilege likely will have a significant chilling effect on the mediation process.").
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Second, moving away from exculpatory evidence only and to the evidentiary
need in criminal cases generally, the scarcity of criminal cases that directly
implicate the need for a mediation privilege is to such a degree that the balancing
equation should reflect this reality. The UMA exception does not. In Olam v.
Congress Mortgage Co., Judge Brazil addressed the infrequency issue and how it
factors in to the equation:
We acknowledge ... that the possibility that a mediator might be
forced to testify over objection could harm the capacity of mediators in
general to create the environment of trust that they feel maximizes the
likelihood that constructive communication will occur during the
mediation session. But the level of harm to that interest likely varies, at
least in some measure, with the perception within the community of
mediators and litigants about how likely it is that any given mediation
will be followed at some point by an order compelling the neutral to
offer evidence about what occurred during the session. I know of no
studies or statistics that purport to reflect how often courts or parties seek
evidence from mediators-and I suspect that the incidence of this issue
arising would not be identical across the broad spectrum of mediation
programs and settings. What I can report is that this case represents the
first time that I have been called upon to address these kinds of questions
in the more than fifteen years that I have been responsible for ADR
programs in this court. Nor am I aware of the issue arising before other
judges here. Based on that experience, my partially educated guess is that
the likelihood that a mediator or the parties in any given case need fear
that the mediator would later be constrained to testify is extraordinarily
small. 76
This very interesting and telling analysis by Judge Brazil, an ADR aficionado,
illustrates how the rarity of cases involving mediation privileges can impact the
ultimate weight assigned to the interest in mediation confidentiality.
Although Olam was a civil action, the case law would suggest that criminal
cases have implicated mediation privileges to an even lesser degree, which is saying
a lot because it is extremely rare in the civil setting as Judge Brazil alluded to. The
infrequency argument, therefore, would presumably hold more sway in the criminal
arena. Even the UMA recognized how infrequently these cases arise, first noting that
the entire gambit of exceptions "often apply to situations that arise only rarely, but
might produce grave injustice if not excepted from the privilege.' ' 177 The drafters
subsequently acknowledge that cases implicating the criminal proceedings exception
constitute even "less common fact patterns."'7
176. 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
177. UNIF. MEDIATION AcT, Prefatory Note.
178. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 6(b).
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Simply put, the infrequency argument is that the interest in mediation
confidentiality is founded upon the fear that repeated disclosure of "confidential"
communications from mediations would have a chilling effect over time, both in
terms of party candor and mediator impartiality. But if the breach were to occur
in only the rarest of cases, then the aggregate breach would not rise to the level of
a chilling effect, at least not to such a degree that such deferential treatment
toward the mediation interest is warranted. Should not the rarity of the exception
being utilized dramatically affect the standards used in determining when to
allow the exception?
In other words, if the circumstances under which the privilege exception for
criminal proceedings might arise are so rare, then that reality should necessarily
affect the overall equation in terms of how much weight maintaining
confidentiality in mediation would carry in the analysis. If this is so rare, as it
appears to be, then what is everyone afraid of? Do confidentiality advocates
sincerely fear an erosion of mediation confidentiality and a realistic breakdown
in the process simply because mediation communications might come into
criminal proceedings every once in a blue moon? Or are proponents just
advocating generally, using the slippery slope argument to head off con-
fidentiality breaches at every front? It may be reasonable to fear the breakdown
of confidentiality if these exceptions would operate to breach a privilege in case
after case, but in criminal proceedings where mediation communications would
so rarely come up, why should the weight that the confidentiality interest carries
remains the same. It should not. Accordingly, the burden of "substantially
outweighs" overestimates the confidentiality interest and should be altered to
reflect the infrequency of the exception's inevitable invocation.
Third, it is ironic that with all of the categorical exceptions that exist under
the UMA, the criminal proceedings exception, with the attendant constitutional
and justice concerns, is a qualified exception with such a heavy burden against
disclosure. 7 9 In each case that the UMA provided for a categorical exception, it is
an explicit recognition by the drafters that the interests in favor of disclosure
automatically trump the interest in confidentiality to such an extent that
disclosure does not require any form of balancing." ° So what this conveys is that,
according to the UMA, the justice and constitutional interests behind the criminal
proceedings exception are so weak relative to the other categorical exceptions
that a strong benefit of the doubt should be given to resisting disclosure.
However, the UMA acknowledges that "society's need for evidence to avoid an
inaccurate decision is greatest in the criminal context.''
s
179. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, § 6(a).
180. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 6 ("The exceptions in Section 6(a) apply regardless
of the need for the evidence because society's interest in the information contained in the mediation
communications may be said to categorically outweigh its interest in the confidentiality of mediation
communications.").
181. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 6(b)(1).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 38
Another irony found within the UMA, which further illustrates the instinct
toward an equal standard, is the first statement explaining the qualified sections
under section 6(b), which of course includes the criminal proceedings exception.
The reporter's notes state: "The exceptions under this Section ... may sometimes
justify carving an exception, but only when. . . the need for the evidence
outweighs the policies underlying the privilege."'82 However, this is not the only
inconsistency between the aspirations of the reporter's notes and the actual
language of the UMA. As noted by Professor Scott H. Hughes: "The Prefatory
Note requires a simple balancing while section 6(b) ... requires a 'need for the
evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality.'
How are these two tests to be reconciled?"'83 Partially because of this and other
internal inconsistencies, Professor Hughes contends that "the UMA test is
unworkable."''
An additional incongruity is found where the UMA pretends "to leave the
critical balancing of these competing interests to the sound discretion of the
courts to determine under the facts and circumstances of each case" whether the
particular mediation evidence should be admissible.'85 If this is the case, and the
UMA genuinely desired to leave the analysis to a judge's sound discretion, then
why is there not a preponderance standard (i.e., "outweighs") for the criminal
proceedings exception? Even if the drafters did not believe that the need for
evidence is strong enough to universally warrant the admissibility of evidence
over confidentiality concerns in the form of a categorical privilege, why place the
burden at the other extreme?
It would seem that the powerful constitutional and justice interests behind the
need for evidence in criminal cases-the same interests that the UMA repeatedly
acknowledges-at least warrant making the balancing mechanism equal, which
would translate to using a preponderance standard. If the courts are charged to
balance these very strong interests on both sides, and the individual circum-
stances of each case must be dispositive as acknowledged by the UMA,I 6 then, at
the very least, the courts must be permitted to commence their balancing analysis
from a level playing field. Creating a greatly lopsided standard that only applies
in one category of criminal proceedings is hardly leaving it to the sound
discretion of the judiciary.
182. UNIF. MEDIATION AcT, Official Comments, § 6(b) (emphasis added).
183. Hughes, supra note 5, at 53-54.
184. Id. at 51.
185. UNIF. MEDIATION AcT, Official Comments, § 6(b)(1).
186. See id. ("[T]he Drafting Committees decided to leave the critical balancing of these competing
interests to the sound discretion of the courts to determine under the facts and circumstances of each case.")
(emphasis added).
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2. A Misguided Distinction
In designing a criminal proceedings exception, the UMA decided to apply
the exception to felonies only, although the drafters do offer model language for
states that "wish to extend [the exception] to misdemeanors.' 87 The majority of
adopting states have followed the UMA's guidance and only apply the exception
to felony proceedings." It is easy to understand why a distinction between felony
and misdemeanor proceedings is appealing, especially when made within a
balancing framework. After all, felony proceedings are, by their very nature,
more "serious" than misdemeanors based on, if nothing else, the possible
punishments that attach to each. 8 9 Ohio's law now makes a similar and stark
distinction, creating a categorical exception for felonies while instituting a
"manifest injustice" standard for misdemeanors.'90 Nevertheless, acknowledging
the inherent distinction between the two categories of cases and subsequently
choosing to employ the distinction in certain legal settings is not unreasonable, as
evidenced by the evolution of the categories themselves.
However, a distinction between felony and misdemeanor proceedings is not
desirable in the case of mediation privileges. Any criminal proceeding exception
should treat felony and misdemeanor proceedings equally, or at the very least
should err on the side of admissibility, as seen under Ohio's approach. It is unfair
and amiss to create an artificial point of demarcation where crimes on one side of
the line are ostensibly serious enough to warrant special treatment while crimes
on the other side are not, especially when misdemeanors constitute the vast
majority of criminal cases.' 9' In other words, can we honestly say that
unauthorized computer use (F5) and repeat motion picture piracy (F5) are
sufficiently worse than negligent homicide (M1) and repeat sexual imposition
(M 1) to the degree that "confidential" evidence should be permitted to potentially
convict, or even acquit, a defendant in the former but not in the latter? 92 Drawing
187. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 6(b)(1).
188. See supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text (discussing the decision by adopting states to
apply the exception in all cases or only in felony proceedings).
189. But even this is not always the case. Under Ohio law, which is similar to most state law, the
maximum penalty for a misdemeanor in the first degree (ML)-which is 180 days-is exactly the same as the
minimum penalty for felonies of both the fifth (F5) and fourth (F4) degrees-which is 6 months. This sentence
overlap between felonies and misdemeanors suggests that utilizing the statutory distinction in other contexts
does not always make sense.
190. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2710.05(A)(9), (B)(1) (2006). But Ohio's modification of the UMA
standard, which effectively placed the two types of proceedings on opposite ends of the spectrum, may have
been the misguided result of political realities and compromise, rather than genuine policy agendas.
191. See Richard C. Reuben, The Sound of Dust Settling: A Response to Criticisms of the UMA, 2003 J.
DisP. RESOL. 99 (2003).
192. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2913.04, 2913.07, 2903.05, 2907.06; see also supra note 189 and
accompanying text (discussing the fact that sentences for misdemeanors and felonies overlap). Furthermore,
there are often categories of offenses where one difference in the crime or in the offender's history will increase
the offense level from an MI to an F5, which can also produce gross inequities when making any type of
significant distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. For example, under Ohio law, motion picture piracy
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such a fine line when the stakes are at their "zenith" has the potential to create
profoundly unjust outcomes. Even the UMA drafters correctly concede that the
need for a criminal proceedings exception arises from the "unique character,
considerations, and concerns that attend the need for evidence in the criminal
process," not the felony process alone.' 93
3. A Misplaced Distinction
Although the UMA utilized a distinction between felony and misdemeanor
proceedings, the drafters at least provided optional language for states to reject
the distinction. As to the differences between exculpatory and inculpatory
evidence, however, the UMA explicitly and unfortunately rejected the making of
a distinction for privilege purposes. In explaining the UMA's criminal
proceedings exception, the drafters reveal that it was "drafted in a manner to
ensure that both the prosecution and the defense have the same right with respect
to evidence, thus requiring a level playing field."' 94 This may appear equitable on
its face, but in practice it simply does not make a great deal of sense. If our
primary reason for stressing and protecting confidentiality is to prevent a chilling
effect on the use of mediation, then it naturally follows that a distinction between
exculpatory evidence and inculpatory evidence is not only practical but also
necessary.
Even though the UMA admitted that the standard was constructed to apply
equally to both sides, they acknowledge that "even without this exception, the
courts can be expected to weigh heavily the need for the evidence in a particular
case, and sometimes will rule that the defendant's constitutional rights require
disclosure."'"5 This statement effectively concedes that exculpatory evidence,
because it implicates the constitutional rights of the accused, carries more weight
than inculpatory evidence. But the ultimate standard under the UMA fails to
reflect this concession, making no distinction between the two categories of
evidence.
Unlike inculpatory evidence and all mediation evidence in a civil setting,
allowing the admission of exculpatory evidence is presumably not adverse,
legally speaking, to any mediation party. 196 In other words, considering the stakes
is an M1 for the first offense but is classified as an F5 for every subsequent offense. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2913.07.
193. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 6(b)(1) (emphasis added).
194. Id.
195. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Official Comments, § 6(b)(1).
196. But see New Jersey v. Williams, 877 A.2d 1258, 1267 (N.J. 2005) ("Defendant's position
trivializes the harm that will result if parties are routinely able to obtain compulsory process over mediators.
Simply because the mediator does not actually testify against the victim (who is, by definition, a non-party to a
State criminal prosecution) does not mean that the victim is unaffected by the prospect that his statements, made
with assurances of confidentiality, will be used to exculpate the person who victimized him. In such
circumstances, the victim could hardly be expected to trust that the mediator was impartial.").
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involved, it is difficult to rebut the instinct that criminal defendants should be
allowed to admit evidence from a mediation when the evidence will not legally
harm the party who is the source of the communication.' Therefore, if mediation
parties are informed, or repeat players become aware, that their communications
during mediation may potentially be used exculpatorily in a future criminal
proceeding involving one of the other mediation participants, this reality will not
adversely affect the perception and utilization of mediation because the evidence
will not hurt the speaker, at least not enough to deter effective communication.
The viability of mediation is simply not at risk because the chilling effect would
be negligible, especially in light of how rare these cases arise. t98
Moreover, if defendants' constitutional rights weigh so heavily into the
privilege equation, as the UMA recognizes, then why treat both forms of
evidence equally? Creating a more liberal exception for scenarios when
mediation communications are to be used only for exculpatory purposes would
presumably solve the constitutional questionability of the current UMA standard.
At first glance, the inequity of an inculpatory/exculpatory distinction may feel
wrong because it gives one side more right to evidence. But it is important to
remember that we are dealing strictly with criminal proceedings. As such, the
two adverse parties are the State and the accused, not two private citizens as in a
civil action. My intent is in no way to downplay the importance of the State's
interest in bringing the guilty to justice-as evident from my earlier
proselytizing' 9-but we would all presumably feel more comfortable allowing
"confidential" communications to be admitted as evidence in a criminal trial if it
was admitted to exonerate the innocent as opposed to convicting the guilty. This
is human nature and once again reflects our tendency to favor acquittal of the
guilty over condemnation of the innocent.
VI. SEARCHING FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISE
A. Alternatives to the UMA Approach
The charge of drafting a complex mediation privilege is not a simple
endeavor by any stretch of the imagination. The drafters of the UMA had an
197. When giving a presentation on the topic of this Article, students were almost universally reluctant
to the idea of a categorical exception in all criminal cases. Being that the students were from a mediation clinic,
they were obviously taught well with respect to the need for mediation confidentiality. However, a large number
of students-those who actually chose to speak up during and after the presentation-qualified their general
reluctance with the idea that exculpatory evidence should be admissible to a greater extent, relative to
inculpatory evidence, not only because of the constitutional rights at stake but also because of the reality that
use of the evidence would not be adverse to the speaker under exculpatory circumstances. Furthermore, many of
the same students expressed an instinct that even inculpatory evidence should be admitted when used to directly
impeach a witness at trial where the testimony is inconsistent with statements made during mediation.
198. But see Hiers, supra note 12, at 584 ("Any criminal proceedings exception to the mediation
privilege likely will have a significant chilling effect on the mediation process.").
199. See supra Part lI1.A (discussing the importance of inculpatory evidence).
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unenviable task and even so, the eventual framework adopted is very successful
on many fronts. However, it is the position of this Article that their attempt at a
criminal proceedings exception falls short. Trying to construct an alternative
structure for the exception is likewise an arduous position. There are so many
variables to consider and so many combinations of standards, factors, and
applications that settling on a final workable and viable framework is certainly
going to be a trial and error process as various privilege structures are adopted
and implemented among the states.
Of the issues that must be considered when talking about any type of
criminal proceedings exception, the following arguably represent the most
compelling. The obvious first step is deciding whether privileges and exceptions
in the criminal context will be categorical or qualified. Second, if any form of
qualified approach is adopted, selecting a legal standard for a possible balancing
test becomes crucial. Next, what types of criminal proceedings (e.g., felonies,
misdemeanors, etc.) will be covered is also very consequential. Fourth, it might
be prudent to consider differential application of an exception to the State and the
accused, in the form of an exculpatory/inculpatory distinction. Another important
area where an exception might be given free reign is where the mediation
evidence will be used for impeachment purposes only. A sixth possibility is to
restrict the application of the exception to circumstances where the mediation
session in question was not the subject of the criminal proceeding at issue-i.e.,
maintain privilege for concurrent civil/criminal scenarios. Perhaps any exception
to a mediation privilege should only operate to allow discovery, rather than
admission of evidence. Finally, maybe any balancing framework constructed
should articulate certain factors and values for the judge to utilize when
undergoing the balancing analysis. 200
B. Prescribing a Happy Medium
Looking at the UMA and Ohio's approach side-by-side is helpful in not only
seeing how a categorical exception can differ according to the many different
variables involved, but also because the two standards reside near the extremes of
the privilege spectrum. While the UMA has no exception for misdemeanor
proceedings and a very high burden in felony proceedings, Ohio has a categorical
exception in felony proceedings and a high burden in misdemeanor
proceedings. 20' As is evident by these two divergent approaches and theconsideration of factors in the preceding section, there are numerous ways to
200. This is quite common in the law. For example, federal judges and many state judges are charged
with sentencing according to certain offense and offender characteristics, theories of punishment, and other
factors. Particularly now that the federal sentencing guidelines have become effectively advisory, the federal
courts are forced to pay much closer attention to Congress's guidance found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2007).
201. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2710.05(A)(9), (B)(1) (2006); see also supra Part IV.C (discussing
the adoption of the UMA by the states and the varied approaches, including Ohio's).
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draft a criminal proceedings exception and the ultimate framework selected can
have a significant impact on when evidence of mediation communications will
come in to a criminal trial. The following will outline a proposal for a new
criminal proceedings exception for consideration by the UMA, as well as the
adopting states.
I propose, first, that the criminal proceedings exception should be extended
to permit the admissibility of any otherwise admissible evidence that is
exculpatory in nature (i.e., a categorical exception). Second, the mediation
privilege should not apply to evidence that will be used only for the purposes of
directly impeaching a witness who testifies inconsistently with statements made
during a mediation (i.e., an additional categorical exception). Third, any criminal
proceedings exception should not apply to mediation communications that
originate from a "criminal mediation." 202 Finally, the admissibility of all other
evidence should be dependent upon a balancing of the need for the evidence and
the need for confidentiality, where the former must only "outweigh" the latter to
be admitted. Utilizing the general format of the UMA,2 °3 the new criminal
proceedings exception would look something like this:
SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS: In this Act:
(1) "Criminal mediation" means a mediation that is administered or
sponsored by the State upon an actual or prospective criminal
prosecution for purposes of resolving the potential criminal charges only.
SECTION 6. EXCEPTIONS TO PRIVILEGE
(a) Subject to subsection (b), there is no privilege under Section 4 for a
mediation communication that is sought or offered in a felony or
misdemeanor proceeding, if:
(1) the communication is exculpatory in nature;
(2) the communication is offered for impeachment purposes only; or
(3) a court, administrative agency, or arbitrator finds, after a hearing in
camera, that the party seeking discovery or the proponent of the evidence
has shown that the evidence is not otherwise available, and that there is a
need for the evidence that outweighs the interest in protecting
confidentiality.
(b) Evidence of a mediation communication is not made admissible by
subsection (a) if the communication originates from a criminal
mediation.
202. See supra note 42 (discussing criminal mediations and the clear need for a categorical privilege).
203. This amendment does not represent an exact substitution of the UMA because the formatting of the
UMA's framework applies the relevant criminal proceedings standards to other subsections that are not directly
implicated by this article.
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My proposal is certainly not based solely on constitutional considerations. It
is overtly value-laden on several levels. I recognize that the constitutional
grounds for lowering the UMA's standard apply only to exculpatory evidence,
hence the categorical exception. But because my proposed changes include a
categorical exception for all exculpatory evidence and evidence admitted for
impeachment purposes, that means that the only type of evidence that is
necessarily implicated in lowering the "substantially outweighs" standard to
"outweighs" is non-impeachment inculpatory evidence.2 Therefore, my decision
to recommend a lesser standard is based more on a fundamental fairness to the
criminal process and a loyalty to the UMA's alleged desire to "create a level
playing field," as well as to leave the critical balancing of these issues to the
sound discretion of the trial judge.
Some may say that the pages of this Article, and other forums of debate in
this area, spend a lot of time parsing over what is, in the end, just one word:
"substantially." But as any practitioner or judge can attest to, the difference
between establishing that the need for a particular piece of evidence
"substantially outweighs" a competing interest is worlds away from requiring a
showing by a mere preponderance (i.e., "outweighs"). 25 Although there is no way
to accurately quantify this comparison,2°6 the significance of the word
"substantially" equates roughly to moving from a burden of 51% to a burden
closer to 80 or 90%. Perhaps this is the difference between a preponderance
standard and a clear and convincing standard. In practical reality, under the UMA
as it stands, any evidence in the form of a mediation communication will come in
only in the most egregious cases of injustice. Under a preponderance standard,
however, evidence will be admissible whenever a judge determines that the
probative value and reliability are such that the evidence is a necessary piece to
the puzzle.
It is important to note that the purpose of the proposed amendment to the
UMA's criminal proceedings exception is to spark an initial reexamination of
mediation privileges in the criminal process. The implications of a new privilege
framework would require a more in-depth assessment prior to actual
implementation to ensure that the proposed prescription would not produce any
negative and unforeseen side-effects. I also concede that the amendment suffers
from the same, yet almost inescapable, ex-post balancing concerns that exist with
any "weighing" of admissibility factors after the fact (i.e., parties can never be
sure, absent categorical privileges or no privileges, that their statements during
204. See supra note 159 (discussing the impeachment distinction).
205. A preponderance of the evidence is, of course, the traditional civil standard that equates to "more
likely than not." This is why, in the current equation, a preponderance approach translates to a test that only
requires the need for the evidence to "outweigh" the need for confidentiality.
206. See Hughes, supra note 5, at 44 ("[W]hat should the burden of proof be on the proponent during the
in camera hearing? Where the language reads 'substantially outweighs,' is the standard similar to probable
cause or a prima facie case? Or does the language require a preponderance of the evidence, a clear and
convincing showing, or an even greater level such as a 'beyond a reasonable doubt'?").
2007 / Balancing the Scales of "Confidential" Justice
mediation will be disclosed in a future criminal trial). But unless and until a
categorical privilege or exception proves prudent in all circumstances, it would
seem impossible to draft a statute that could account for every scenario without
necessitating an individual balancing of certain factors in each case. Overall,
however, I believe the solution proposed constitutes a happy medium between
the approach utilized by the UMA, which is overly exclusionary, and the Ohio
approach, which is overly inclusive (at least for felony proceedings).
VII. CONCLUSION
Truthfully, when I began formulating the discourse for this Article, my own
beliefs about how a mediation privilege should look in a criminal setting were far
more black and white. In the further interest of candor, I will admit that I found it
difficult to comprehend how evidence could ever be excluded from a criminal
trial simply because it originated in mediation. It seemed preposterous at the
time, though it still may in a given case.2°' To that end, not only was I
convinced-and remain so-that the "substantially outweighs" threshold under
the UMA was too high and perhaps unconstitutionally so, but I was also initially
prepared to flip the tables entirely, requiring instead that mediation evidence only
be excluded in a criminal proceeding when the need for confidentiality in
mediation "substantially outweighs" the need for the evidence brought forth.
Going a step further, I thought that perhaps even a categorical exception was
warranted for all mediation evidence in criminal proceedings given the stakes
involved.
But I have since seen the light, or perhaps the penumbra, so to speak. I now
realize that the infinite array of circumstances that arise in this context requires
some form of balancing to address individual justice while still adequately
accounting for the benefits society derives from mediation and the degree to
which mediation requires confidentiality to remain a viable mechanism. °s This
balancing, however, should commence in each case, at minimum, from
equipoise. While my position on absolute admissibility may have softened,
though only in the inculpatory context, my belief that the need for evidence in the
abstract should at minimum stand on equal footing with the need for
confidentiality in mediation remains vehemently adamant. Further, in
maintaining the "substantially outweighs" standard, it communicates the wrong
message. It is tantamount to saying that we as a society place the goals of an
207. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Williams, 877 A.2d 1258 (N.J. 2005).
208. See Hughes, supra note 5, at 46-47 ("When deciding whether to compel a mediator's testimony, a
court must determine whether the damage to the mediation process is outweighed by the damage to the
individual's interests.... However, the risk of such harm is highly contextual and depends both upon the nature
of the mediator's testimony and the mediator's style of mediation, which seem to be as numerous as the blades
on a well-manicured lawn.").
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 38
institution in place to assist the administration of justice over the goals of a
system that exists to do justice.
Nevertheless, regardless of what approach is adopted by states for criminal
proceedings (absent states with absolute privileges), it is clear that mediators and
the ADR field as a whole must collectively reassess how parties are informed
about the "true" confidentiality of their communications during mediation. 20
Parties should unquestionably be placed on notice concerning the rules and law
that will govern their particular mediation session, even though that law is not
always concrete when dealing with ex-post balancing standards. 2' The failure to
do so, at least in the inculpatory context, and also when dealing with court-
annexed mediation, raises very serious criminal due process and fair play
concerns.
In the end, the mandate of mediation-"self-determination"-requires that
parties are informed about the process, their rights, and the law with respect to
confidentiality. Mediation is a vital mechanism in place to help both the
individual parties to a dispute and the system as a whole, but in the worst of
scenarios, parties should always be given the opportunity to exit mediation no
worse off than when they entered. However, once evidence arises during civil
mediation, justice will often demand the public utilization of such evidence in the
criminal arena. After all, justice may be blind-need she also be deaf?
209. See Hiers, supra note 12, at 584 ("As states consider adopting the U.M.A., this significant
exception to the mediation privilege deserves attention and discussion.").
210. See id. ("In states which have adopted the U.M.A., attorneys and mediators probably should make
sure that the parties know that statements they make during a mediation may be used later to prosecute them in
criminal proceedings.").

